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Abstract
In intelligent transportation systems, cooperative mobility planning is considered to
be one of the challenging problems. Mobility planning as it stands today is an in-
dividual decision-making effort that takes place in an environment governed by the
collective actions of various competing travellers. Despite the extensive research on
mobility planning, a situation in which multiple behavioural-driven travellers partic-
ipate in a cooperative endeavour to help each other optimize their objectives has not
been investigated. Furthermore, due to the inherent multi-participant nature of the
mobility problem, the existing solutions fail to produce ground truth optimal mobil-
ity plans in the practical sense - despite their claimed and well proven theoretical
optimality.
This thesis proposes a multi-module team mobility planning framework to address
the team trip planning problem with a particular emphasis on modelling the inter-
action between behaviour-driven rational travellers. The framework accommodates
the travellers’ individual behaviours, preferences, and goals in cooperative and com-
petitive scenarios. The individual behaviours of the travellers and their interaction
processes are viewed as a team trip planning game. For this game, a theoretical anal-
ysis is presented, which includes an analysis of the existence and the balancedness of
the final solution.
The proposed framework is composed of three principal modules: cooperative trip
planning, team formation, and traveller-centric trip planning (TCTP). The cooper-
ative trip planning module deploys a bargaining model to manage conflicts between
the travellers that could occur in their endeavour to discover a general, satisfactory
solution. The number of players and their interaction process is controlled by the
team formation module. The TCTP module adopts an alternative perspective to the
iv
individualized trip-planning problem in the sense that it is being behavioural driven
problem. This allows for multitudes of traveler centric objectives and constraints, as
well as aspects of the environment as they pertain to the traveller’s preferences, to be
incorporated in the process. Within the scope of the team mobility planning frame-
work, the TCTP is utilized to supply the travellers with personalized strategies that
are incorporated in the cooperative game. The concentration problem is used in this
thesis to demonstrate the effectiveness of the TCTP module as a behavioural-driven
trip planner.
Finally, to validate the theoretical set-up of the team trip planning game, we
introduce the territory sharing problem for social taxis. We use the team mobility
framework as a basis to solve the problem. Furthermore, we present an argument
for the convergence and the efficiency of a coarse correlated equilibrium. In addition
to the validation of a variety of theoretical concepts, the territory sharing problem
is used to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed framework in dealing with
cooperative mobility planning problems.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The trip planning problem has become a pivotal consideration of modern daily ac-
tivities. The process of mobility planning often includes mobility resource selection
and cost estimation. Factors such as temporal budgets and anticipated arrival times
are examined to determine whether the trip is successful. In this sense, trip planning
can be perceived as an individual endeavour. Nevertheless, due to its nature, the trip
planning problem is a competitive process in which multiple individuals compete for
the same resources. Each decision made by a traveller has an impact on the system
and affects other travellers. Hence, there is a need to simultaneously address both
facets of this problem.
This chapter presents an overview of the trip planning problems and discusses
the motivation and objectives of this research work. The chapter concludes with the
outline of this thesis.
1.1 Overview and Motivation
Various solutions have been proposed to approach the problem of mobility planning,
ranging from Personal Navigation Devices (PNDs) to the various navigation appli-
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cations now available for smart devices [1, 2]. These solutions approach the mobility
planning problem from a single traveller’s perspective. They plan trips independent
of the mobility actions and the decisions of other travellers. Thus, they fail to produce
an optimal solution in a practical sense.
The main shortcoming of existing mobility planning solutions, with few exceptions
such as the work in [3], is that they do not consider the trip planning decisions
made by other travellers. To a large extent, this is caused by their perception of
mobility planning as an individual behaviour-driven and time-constrained process;
for example, this can be observed in the work presented in [4–7]. This view has arisen
due to certain technological limitations pertaining to areas such as communications
between travellers, data exchange protocols, and the scarcity of the computational
power. Although many of these constraints have been reduced or even eliminated,
the perception of mobility planning as an individual effort has persisted. Based
on this view of planning, it is natural for conflicts to arise among the various trip
plans produced by different travellers. These conflicts are best demonstrated by
examples of road congestions, intensive road traffic, inefficient parking facilitation,
among others. There are numerous situations in which the relationship between
travellers is reduced to a competitive process. This competitive process has the
potential to be counterproductive to the overall objective of efficient mobility.
Even though the trip planning problem is viewed as an individualized problem,
the awareness of its multi-participant nature is practically evident and observed.
Regular changes in network conditions often occur due to the decisions made by other
travellers. For instance, in dangerous weather conditions, safety becomes a significant
concern. Certain routes are closed and others have warnings advising travellers to
seek alternatives. As a consequence, many travellers may arrive at the same decision
regarding the safest path given their perceived knowledge of the impact of weather
2
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on their commuting options. This unawareness of others’ decisions may transform
what initially would have been considered a safe path into one with increased risk
due to congestion. In other words, due to the fact that roads are inherently shared
resources, the individualized choice of alternatives has the potential to worsen the
situation for all network users.
The above-mentioned scenario of traffic management during weather anomalies
signifies the need for a group-centric method in which drivers/travellers coordinate
among themselves to obtain a robust optimal decision. Crowd coordination and coop-
eration is one of the next logical steps of informed trip planning. Modern vehicles are
equipped with various means of communication. With applications such as collision
avoidance, vehicles can communicate to facilitate cooperation. Furthermore, once a
communication channel is established, travellers can share their intentions, desires
and future plans in real time.
The technological advancements in fields of communication, localization, and com-
putational processes have allowed the travellers to engage in a cooperative trip plan-
ning. For example, social based navigation solutions, such as WAZE, in which trav-
ellers communicate among themselves to enhance a multitude of performance factors,
have gained adoption due to their better informed trip navigation guidance [8]. These
technological improvements and social changes have enabled improvements in trip
planning. Crowdsourced data is another example of the transition from traditional
trip planning to a more dynamic and personalized approach, as can be seen in the
study presented in [4].
Moreover, in the various intelligent transportation systems, there are several ex-
amples of team trip planning. The vehicle routing problem for a group of taxis
exemplifies a case in which the number of taxis or moving vehicles are optimized
to match the required demand and the available routes. Nevertheless, much of the
3
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conducted work on this problem has regarded the vehicles as a part of a fleet that
is managed ultimately as a single body, and therefore the individual decisions of the
drivers are not considered. Another example is that of traditional taxi companies, in
which the dispatcher makes the routing decisions for all drivers [9]. Furthermore, in
reality, the majority of the taxis are in fact free agents who are executing their own
agendas and do not necessarily abide by the commands received from their dispatcher.
The best example of a situation in which car drivers are behaving as free agents is
that of online transportation network companies. Other applications can be observed
in the field of ad-hoc commercial advertisements, election campaign volunteers, and
snowplough contractors, among others. The common factor among all these appli-
cations is the issue of coordinating between different agents who are aiming to solve
different problems such that their independent actions do not negatively impact each
other. Therefore, regardless of the application, there is a fundamental need to devise
a framework to solve the team trip planning problem.
The primary challenging aspect of solving the team trip planning problem is the
lack of a comprehensive platform that captures the needs of the travellers while facil-
itating a team approach to the problem. Satisfying the needs of the many competing
agents in any process is a complex task. Furthermore, for travellers to cooperate,
they must be first motivated. For example, the knowledge that their individual gains
would be greater through cooperation than if they were to act selfishly can be an
effective motivational factor.
The main goal of this thesis is to develop a multi-traveller framework that can
facilitate cooperation between travellers so that all travellers can achieve their mo-
bility objectives, subject to individual constraints and strategies. This mobility goal
attainment recognizes the potential for conflict between the mobility demands of
the different travellers and as such, attempts to strike a balance between these de-
4
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mands to ensure optimal resource utilization. In order to realise this goal, I develop
a multi-traveller Team Mobility Planning (TMP) framework that approaches the trip
planning problem in the form of a game. A game theoretic approach is developed
to manage the problem of cooperation between conflicting travellers. This planning
problem is referred to as the team trip planning game.
Game theory is chosen due to its ability to capture the complex dynamics of the
team trip planning problem. The individual travellers can be viewed as players, their
chosen plans can be formulated as strategies, and the problem can be formulated as
a non-cooperative trip planning problem that revolves around the attainment of an
equilibrium. The game-theoretic model can be used to improve the personal out-
comes for the travellers and the overall state of the system. Furthermore, under
appropriate conditions, these travellers are provided with the necessary tools for co-
operation. The outcome of such cooperation may be similar to or even better than
their non-cooperative outcomes. Hence, to solve the team trip planning problem, it
is imperative that it is addressed through both disciplines of game theory: the co-
operative and the non-cooperative. In this thesis, travellers are assumed to be able
to engage in a collaborative problem solving discourse in which they compete for
resources and collaborate to accomplish their individual goals.
1.2 Research Objectives
The research reported in this thesis has three goals: 1) to consider the trip planning
problem as a cooperative game for which a solution model must be designed, 2) to
consider the trip planning problem as an individualized problem that is approached
as a non-cooperative game, and 3) to merge both concepts of cooperation and com-
petition into the solution. These three goals can be achieved by meeting the following
5
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objectives:
1. Perform an extensive background survey and literature review on trip planning.
The survey should cover the various game theory-based trip planning problems
and solutions attempts .
2. Develop a game formulation for the team trip planning problem that encom-
passes the individual and team aspects of the problem. The mathematical
formulation of the problem should facilitate the development of framework for
solving the problem.
3. Develop a multi-module team mobility framework to solve the team trip plan-
ning problem. To address the aspects of cooperation and competition, this
framework should include a traveller-centric trip planning module as well as a
cooperative trip planning module.
4. Study the balancedness of the trip planning game and develop an argument
regarding the existence of a solution for this game.
5. Develop a bargaining model to solve the game theoretic part of the cooperative
trip planning problem. Conduct experimental scenarios that demonstrate the
performance of the developed bargaining model and demonstrate its efficiency.
6. Develop a traveller centric-trip planning (TCTP) system that can be used to
produce personalized strategies for the team trip planning game.
7. Use the TCTP system as a method to analyze and solve the concentration
problem as a non-cooperative trip planning game.
8. Formulate a territory-sharing trip-planning game that can be used to demon-
strate the cooperative and competitive aspects of the game.
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9. Use the proposed framework to demonstrate that by using the team mobility
framework, a solution for the cooperative and the non-cooperative team plan-
ning game exists and can be found.
1.3 Thesis Organization
This thesis is composed of the following chapters:
Chapter 1 presents the motivation behind the research work as well as its objectives.
Chapter 2 provides a literature review of various topics related to the research.
Chapter 3 presents a formulation for the team trip planning problem. It presents a
model formulation and guidelines for the developed solution. A multi-module frame-
work named Team Mobility Planning (TMP) is introduced in this chapter.
Chapter 4 discusses the balancedness of the trip planning game and develops an
argument regarding the existence of a solution for this game. It also presents the
bargaining based solution model for the team trip planning game. Experimental sce-
narios are presented to demonstrate the performance of the proposed solution model.
Chapter 5 presents a traveller-centric trip planning module and discusses the effect
of its deployment on the concentration problem and the welfare of the traffic system.
Chapter 6 presents the territory sharing game as a case study to demonstrate the
effectiveness of the team mobility planning framework. The notion of regret-models
and coarse correlated equilibrium is also discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 7 provides a summary of the contributions of this research work and dis-
cusses area for future research.
7
Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Trip planning is a multifaceted research topic and many of its variants found in the
literature remain challenging problems. The Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP) and
the Vehicle Routing Problem (VRP) are good examples. Moreover, trip planning is
inherently concerned with routing and path finding. Routing and path finding are
presented in various fields, such as transportation, communication, and networking.
Thus, to better understand the trip planning problem, there is a need to study its
variants along with the various solutions and algorithms developed over the past
decades.
Predominantly, different trip planning problems have been regarded as pure opti-
mization problems, for which various solution algorithms have been developed. Ad-
ditionally, game theory, as a method of problem modelling, was successfully deployed
to solve the trip planning problems. This chapter discusses trip planning in terms of
both disciplines of operational research and game theory, with particular emphasis
on the latter.
In order to deduce the method of finding a solution, pure optimization approaches
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develop the (Multi) objective(s) function and problem constraints. In the game the-
oretic approach, the analysis process is more complicated. In addition to the need
to define the objective function and constraints, it is necessary to define the game as
cooperative or non-cooperative. Once a game is defined, many issues and challenges,
such as the existence and the stability of the solutions, need to be addressed. Further-
more, the different problem formulations, whether pure optimization or game theory,
share similarities even if the problem formulations appear to be different. Because of
these similarities, the chapter covers many trip planning problems in terms of formu-
lation, solution model development, existence, stability, and convergence analysis. A
comprehensive review and understanding of the recent research activities in this area
is presented. The following topics are covered in this chapter:
• A brief review of the trip planning problem and some of its variants as combi-
natorial problems.
• Game theory: a background study on game theory is provided in order to
properly understand the theory and introduce relevant terminologies that are
particular to this field of study.
• A description of cooperative and non-cooperative trip planning games is pre-
sented. Several examples of such games are also discussed.
• Two prominent examples of cooperative and competitive planning games are
reviewed: bargaining games and congestion games.
• The challenging issues of trip planning that have motivated the research of this
thesis are presented.
The literature work related to the various aspects of this research work can extend
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beyond the scope of this chapter. Therefore, in situations when the need arises, the
appropriate related research will be covered in the other chapters.
2.2 Trip Planning as Optimization Problem
Due to its inherent importance in the daily activity of individuals and organization,
trip planning has become an active area of research, particularly in recent years. Trip
planning is largely discussed in the literature as an optimization problem in which
objective functions and constraints are formulated and utilized in the search for an
optimal solution. In other words, trip planning can be viewed as an optimal routing
problem.
The most well-known trip planning problem is the shortest route problem. In this
problem, a single traveller aims to minimize his/her trip cost as the trip starts from
a known pre-determined starting point to a known pre-determined ending point. For
a directed graph G(V,E), the shortest path problem can be formulated using linear
programming as the following:
minimize
∑
i,j∈E
Ci,jxi,j (2.1)
subject to:
xi,j > 0 (2.2)∑
i,j∈E
xi,j −
∑
i,j∈E
xj,i =

1, if i = S;
−1, if i = D;
0, otherwise.
(2.3)
where Ci,j is the cost of using link i → j, S,D are the source and destination, and
xi,j is the decision variable.
One of the most widely-known techniques to solve this problem is Dijkstra’s algo-
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rithm [10]. Dijkstra’s algorithm searches for the shortest path in a graph-modulated
map. In general, a cost is associated with each link in the graph, and the route with
the minimum cost is chosen. The parameters based on which the cost is calculated
differ depending on the nature of the problem.
Another trip planning problem is the vehicle routing problem (VRP). In VRP,
the objective is to coordinate a fleet of vehicles in order to determine an optimal
route. The VRP can be modified to accommodate a number of constraints, one
of which is a time window (VRPTW). Much of the research work on this problem
has been directed at developing the best algorithm for solving this problem in a
reasonable time [11–14]. The VRPTW is a multi-objective problem that can be used
for formulating and solving the trip-planning problem. Many techniques have been
proposed in the literature for solving the VRPTW, such as the ant colony technique,
in which the use of pheromones enables a fleet of vehicles to cooperate in order to
determine the optimal route. In the implementation of the ant colony approach, an
ant represents a vehicle. The goal is that through the use of pheromones, the fleet of
vehicles will learn which routes effectively minimize the number of required vehicles
and the total cost of the trip [15]. Genetic algorithms (GAs) provide a heuristic
approach for solving the VRPTW. With GAs the solution space is represented as
chromosomes, and at each generation, two parents mate based on specific criteria
such as fitness-based selection [16]. For example, in [16] a two-phase GA approach
was proposed, in which each chromosome represents a cluster of routes, and the first
gene in the chromosome represents the first customer to be served. In the VRPTW,
there are multiple participants with multiple objectives.
The Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP) is also considered to be one of the most
famous optimization trip planning problems [17]. The most interesting aspect of the
TSP as a trip planning problem is that there are numerous problems that can be
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described similarly to the TSP and can thus be approached in a similar manner. For
instance, in [18], Vansteenwegen et al. describe a tourist trip planning problem as
one in which tourists attempt to travel from a starting point to an end point while
crossing specific points of interest within a certain time window. The optimization
solution described in [18] can be used to solve this tourist trip planning problem. This
problem, which shares similarities with the TSP, is called the Orienteering Problem
(OP); however, the traveller is not required to traverse all points of interest.
Another well-known routing problems is the max flow problem, first described
in [19]. This problem discusses the issue of maximizing the flows in networks given
their capacity. The problem can be stated as the following: given a graph G(V,E),
flow f , and link capacity Lc, what is the greatest achievable flow in the network given
its capacity?
In the context of vehicle routing, trip planning has received significant attention.
A vast proportion of the research focused on routing decisions is concentrated on
trip planning based on trip times that are fixed [10] or variant [20]. When other
parameters are considered, such as safety, comfortability, or monetary budgets, most
of the existing research has been directed towards the consideration of each of these
requirements as a separate objective. Hence, for all of these parameters, the routing
problem is solved as a multi-objective problem. In [21], Blue et al. proposed the use
of a bi-objective path search approach for in-vehicle routing. The first objective was
to minimize the trip time, while the second objective was to minimize the complexity.
Complexity is viewed with regard to lane change, merge and weaving movements such
that driving straight ahead has 0 complexity index and performing a U-turn has a
complexity index of 0.5. The final decision with regard to the best route is made by
performing trade-offs between trip time and trip complexity. Similar work for cyclist
routing with a bi-objective function is found in [22], in which monetary and time
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based objective functions are considered separately for cyclist route choice. In [23],
Raith et al. viewed trip times and toll costs as separate route choice objectives and
aimed to develop heuristic algorithms to obtain a solution for the Multi-Objective
Traffic Assignment (MTA) problem. Trip times and toll cost values are considered
as cost functions. Iteratively, the shortest and the longest link with positive flow are
found for every route and are equilibrated by shifting some of the flow from the longest
link to the shortest link until their travel times are equal and the solution is found.
Even though the main concept in the aforementioned research was to formulate the
routing problem as a multi-objective problem, the actual research only involved the
use of a bi-objective problem. Similarly, in [24] Duque et al. propose a bi-objective
exact algorithm that aggressively prune dominated solutions while at the same time
minimizing the trip cost and trip time objectives.
The research studies discussed thus far have the drawback of formulating each cost
function, or demand that might arise, as a separate objective function. For a multi-
tude of demands, the optimization problem could become computationally infeasible.
A sensible approach is to find a generalized cost function that accommodates many
primary cost functions, such as toll cost and trip complexity, and then the optimiza-
tion function will have to manage single or a limited number of objective function(s).
Such an approach is called multi-criteria based vehicle routing. For example, in [25]
Chen et al. have presented a generalized cost function in which a weighted sum of
time and toll cost functions across possible road segments is computed.
An additional problem found in the reviewed literature is that travellers make their
decisions to incur a change in the state of the network. This change does not consider
the decisions made by others that will also change the state of the environment (i.e.,
it is entirely possible that the factors on which basis a decision is made are changing
as well, which could lead to results that are not optimal). To resolve this problem
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of conflicting interests and actions, trip planning and its variants have been studied
using game theory.
2.3 Game Theoretical Representation of Trip Plan-
ning
In the pure optimization approach, multiple-planning decisions are made without con-
sideration for their effects on each other. Game theory can be employed to represent
the individual traveller’s decision based on pure optimization as well as the consider-
ation of other travellers. In other words, game theory provides mathematical tools to
analyze situations in which there are several decision-makers with conflicting interests
that lead them to compete, or mutual benefits that causes them to cooperate [26]. If
these decision-makers were to compete among themselves to gain access to resources,
the non-cooperative game theory assists a decision-maker in establishing the optimal
system design in terms of individual planning (i.e., choosing strategies), as well as in
terms of infrastructure design.
In terms of infrastructure design, it could be argued that constructing more roads
and bridges will improve the overall travelling performance. Nevertheless, an ap-
proach that guarantees effective planning is needed. Game theory provides the nec-
essary analytical tools to monitor and assist with the upgrading process [27]. These
tools and functionalities not necessarily as available or as powerful when used with
traditional pure optimization approaches. Furthermore, in an environment that per-
mits the communication between travellers, cooperation in planning is an intuitive
approach that can be observed in the day-to-day practices. The notion of team work-
ing is an integral part of the cooperative game theory formulation. For travellers,
depending on their geographical location and their previous experiences, knowledge
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sharing can enhance the overall trip planning process. Game theoretical representa-
tion provides the necessary tools to formulate and manifest a cooperative trip planning
approach.
Additionally, game theory provides a variety of methods through which trip gains
or costs can be distributed among travellers within the same team in a rational and
efficient manner. Travellers, through the utilization of game theory, improve their
chances of paying less or gaining more by joining a group than by acting alone. The
next section provides a background review on game theory.
2.4 Background on Game Theory
Modern game theory studies can be traced back to the early years of the twentieth
century in Zermelo’s work in [28] (translated in [29]), Von Neumann’s work in [30], and
most notably in Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s seminal work in [31]. A number
of definitions have subsequently been proposed on the matter of games and game
theory. Osborn and Rubinstein define a game in [32] as “a description of strategic
interaction that includes the constraints on the actions that the players can take
and the players’ interests, but does not specify the actions that the players do take.”
In [26], Myerson defines game theory as “the study of mathematical models of conflict
and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers.” These definitions serve
the purpose of this chapter, as the majority of the work presented hereafter is based
on these concepts.
Games are generally categorized into two types: non-cooperative and cooperative
[32]. Non-cooperative games are those that involve the analysis of one player’s best
response given the other players’ anticipated actions. The situation in which no
player wishes to unilaterally change his/her decision is called a state of equilibrium.
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In non-cooperative games, various equilibria can be used to represent the solution.
The best-known equilibrium is Nash’s equilibrium. Nash’s equilibrium exists in a
game when each player has a correct expectation of the other players’ behaviours and
acts rationally. Player are behaving rationally, as indicated in [31], when they make
decisions in order to maximize their gains and satisfy their preferences.
A Nash equilibrium always exists whenever there is a game that is convex and has
continuous and semi-concave set of utility values [32]. However, in strictly competi-
tive games, such as the zero sum games, a pure Nash equilibrium is non existent. In
games with pure strategies, all strategies, and associated utilities, are deterministic,
(i.e., a player knows which strategy to use for any particular situation). When play-
ers are permitted to have mixed strategies, which are defined through a probabilistic
distribution over pure strategies and their associated utilities instead of finding a
deterministic payoff in the game, the expected payoff is statistically computed. In
general, for n-players in a game, a mixed Nash equilibrium always exists [31]. Never-
theless, even if the existence of an equilibrium is established, the challenge truly lies
in how to find this equilibrium.
Non-cooperative games are mostly concerned with choosing the best strategy in
a game in order to find an equilibrium state. Although information about the other
players’ previous actions, preferences, and expected payoffs are largely known, not
every equilibrium correspond to the optimum outcome. In non-cooperative games,
due to various “bad” strategic choices, players may ultimately arrive at a bad equi-
librium. On the other hand, in cooperative games, players can review their possible
strategies and outcomes. Once a situation is found in which everybody benefits, an
enforced binding agreement between players is established.
The principal challenge in cooperative games is to find a fair allocation for the
joint cost or profit. The set of all feasible allocations is called the core. The core
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was first defined for n-players participating in non zero-sum games by Gillies in [33].
The process of core formulation needs to satisfy aspects of efficiency and rationality
for all players. Furthermore, issues such as core balancedness require attention in the
process of finding and establishing the final agreement between players. Players, for
whom a fair allocation is sought, are grouped in teams named coalitions. Coalitions
can be a set of one or more players. The set with all player is called the grand
coalition.
2.5 Non-Cooperative Trip Planning
Non-cooperative trip planning games provide a powerful analysis tool, through which
an understanding is gained of not only the direct trip planning decision in terms of
goal achievement, but also the effect these decisions might have on the surrounding en-
vironment as well as the other involved travellers. One of the earliest non-cooperative
trip planning theoretic formulations is the Wardrop equilibrium [34]. In this game, no
traveller can obtain a better journey time by changing routes. In his work, Wardrop
addressed the issue of redistributing the flow of traffic among alternative routes, which
led to two criteria. The first criterion, (i.e., the Wardrop equilibrium), states that
“The journey times on all the routes actually used are equal, and less than those
which would be experienced by a single vehicle on any unused route.” The second
criterion states that the average journey time for all journeys is minimum.
The problem addressed by the Wardrop equilibrium is stated as follows: given the
flow value Q and the constants b1, b2,....,bD, p1, p2,....,pD for route i, where pD and bD
are constants related to the road attributes which routes should be taken to obtain
the same similar average journey time, t, on all routes and what the value of t.
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The journey time, ti, for the route i is computed as the follows:
ti =
bi
1− qi
pi
(2.4)
where qi is a part of the flow Q such that
D∑
1
qi = Q (2.5)
For b1 < b2 < b3.... < bD, for route i, bi is the journey time if the additional flow on
that route, qi, is 0. For j routes in which t > bj and t ≥ bj+1, if all these routes are
in use, t is always greater than bi. Thus, for route i
qi = pi(1− bi
t
) where i = 1, 2, 3, ..., j (2.6)
For an appropriate t, Q can be computed for j routes as the following:
Q =
j∑
i=1
pi − 1
t
j∑
i=1
pibi (2.7)
In order to solve for several values of t, we can compare the different Q values against
the various t values. The value that corresponds to the given Q is the solution of the
problem.
The Wardrop equilibrium is based on the assumption that travellers are not co-
operating among themselves to find the solution. In this sense, the Wardrop equi-
librium can be considered as a special case of Nash equilibrium. Fisk, in [35], noted
that Wardrop equilibrium is identical to Nash equilibrium, such that it considers the
traveller as a player in a routing game. In [36], Smith altered Wardrop equilibrium
by stating that “A traffic distribution is a Wardrop equilibrium when no driver has
a less costly alternative route.”
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2.5.1 Non-Cooperative Networks: Selfish Routing
Road networks in which travellers are sharing resources and selfishly attempting to
improve their trip times are referred to as non-cooperative networks. Selfish routing
games provide a valuable insight into non-cooperative games. In the next section,
non-cooperative networks and selfish routing are discussed in detail.
2.5.1.1 Non-Cooperative Networks
In [37], Feldmann et al. studied a non-cooperative network with parallel links con-
necting one source to one destination. Each traveller has a strategy that, based on
certain probabilistic distribution, chooses the route that minimizes their cost. The
cost in this network is the maximum latency of the feasible links. The routing prob-
lem in [37] is treated as a scheduling problem that does not initially seek an equilib-
rium. Nonetheless, the authors present an algorithm for Nashification- the process
of converting a non-equilibrium solution into a Nash equilibrium. The Nashification
algorithm suggests that the user should perform selfish greedy routing in every link
until an equilibrium is found. This algorithm comes with the cost of having an expo-
nential execution time. Once the Nashification process is implemented, the research
in [38], which discussed the same game setup, can be used to establish the uniqueness
and the complexity of the resulted equilibrium. In [38], Fotakis et al. provide a proof
of existence for pure Nash equilibria for routing games and provide an algorithm to
compute the equilibria in polynomial time.
In [39], a measure of performance labelled as the social cost is defined as the ex-
pectation of maximum latency caused by the traffic. This measure is considered as a
distinguishing factor between the various selfish routing models proposed in the liter-
ature. (i.e., the value of this measure indicates the goodness of any non-cooperative
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trip planning game). In [40], a hybrid model is proposed in which Wardrop equilib-
rium and the model presented in [39] are used. Their hybrid model is similar to the
one in [39] except for the social cost, which corresponds to the sum of the expected
individual costs. The equilibrium that has the highest social cost is considered as the
worst Nash equilibrium in the game. The ratio of the highest and lowest social cost
is denoted as the price of anarchy [41,42].
There are several issues that are usually investigated when analyzing non-cooperative
networks. The intuitive approach to reducing the journey times might lie in expand-
ing the infrastructure, such as constructing roads, bridges. Regardless of the financial
feasibility of this solution, it is not a guaranteed strategy. Braess paradox describes a
situation in which adding resources to a network may in fact cause the travel times to
increase. In [43], Steinberg and Zangwill have shown that the Braess paradox is a well
likely phenomenon and it might happen under certain conditions. Non-cooperative
networks are discussed as methods of analysis of the different possible situations in
the attempt to find the system’s equilibrium. The decision-maker could exploit this
knowledge to produce a policy guaranteeing a successful planning. For instance, by
examining the Braess paradox and the price of anarchy, a better network infrastruc-
ture design can be made in a form of educated decisions regarding the overall network
layout such that the overall traffic is optimized. Furthermore, a dispatcher who is
tasked with sending a flow of traffic can make a better decision of how to split the
traffic among different paths throughout the understanding of the existing equilibria.
2.5.1.2 Selfish Routing
The research work on selfish routing has been motivated by several practical net-
working problems such as the Braess paradox. Feldmann et al. have noted in [44]
that despite the existence of Braess paradox, there are strict sub-networks that have
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improved performance. Nevertheless, the lack of regularization for large networks in
the sense of the availability of an established centralized decision-making system has
made it difficult for the improved performance in the sub-network to converge into
overall improved performance. For large networks with a dynamic flow of large num-
ber of travellers, it is practically impossible to form a central unit for decision making
to control the flow of traffic. Hence, the travellers resort to their selfish strategies
to maximize their gains and minimize their trip costs. Selfish games are used to
characterize and investigate the impact of these selfish strategies.
Selfish routing games were first introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou in
their seminal work on non-cooperative games in [39]. These games were introduced
to investigate the consequences of the absence of coordination between the users in
a network, even when their information and computational resources are unlimited.
In non-cooperative networks, travellers attempt to send their traffic through shared
links from a source to a destination while attempting to satisfy personal objective
functions. Travellers do not consider the global performance of the network when
they make their decisions. They will attempt to selfishly devise their own strategies
to minimize their cost by using as many pure strategies as the number of available
links [45]. In [46], Roughgarden categorizes selfish routing games into two main
categories: 1) non-atomic selfish routing games in which users contribute a negligible
amount of traffic to the network, and 2) atomic selfish routing games in which users
contribute a non-negligible amount of traffic. The non-atomic equilibrium flow can
be described as the following: for pairs of paths between sources and destinations
(S1, D1), ......, (Sk, Dk), these pairs are called commodities. For commodity i, the set
of all paths is ρi from Si to Di and the feasible path between Si to Di is P such that
P ∈ ρi. There exists an edge cost ce and edge flow fe such that fe =
∑
P :e∈P fP where
fe is the summation of the traffic from all paths that has the edge e. Furthermore,
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there exists an inelastic traffic Tr such that
∑
P∈ρi fP = Tri . The flow f for all feasible
paths ρi where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, , , , , k} such that P , P˜ ∈ ρi. The optimum flow is the flow
that satisfy the following:
cP (f) ≤ cP˜ (f) (2.8)
Non-atomic selfish routing games are concerned with traffic flow according to the
network structures rather than the players. However, since players affect the flow
in the network in the atomic selfish routing games, the equilibrium flow for these
games is presented differently. The commodities in this type of game correspond to
the players rather than to the network. For the feasible flow f for the atomic selfish
routing game, f is traffic flow in equilibrium if, for every player i and every path
P, P˜ ∈ ρi of Si and Di paths, and f (i)P > 0:
cP (f) ≤ cP˜ (f˜) (2.9)
The term f˜ is the same as f . However, when f˜
(i)
P = 0, we have f˜
(i)
P˜
= ri. Extensive
survey on atomic selfish routing games is found in [47].
2.5.2 Applicability of Non-Cooperative Routing Games
In the process of implementing non-cooperative routing games in real applications,
several issues need to be addressed; this includes issues such as who the players are,
what are the payoffs, and what are the available actions. According to these issues,
a game can be appropriately defined [48]. In this section, a variety of examples
describing non-cooperative routing games is reported.
In [49], Levinson introduces a two-player congestion game. In this game, the
available strategies consist of the departure times. Each player has the choice to
either leave early or on time. Strategies in this game describe the action taken by
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both players to depart earlier, on time or late. The actions are made independently
such that if one player decides to leave earlier, the other player still has the option
to leave earlier, late, or on time. For different journey times, different equilibria are
reported in [49]. A different type of routing game reported in the literature describes
a situation in which a traveller plays against the environment. In such games, the
environment is viewed as an evil entity - a demon - whose aim is to cause the traveller
to lose. At the same time, the traveller attempts to minimize his/her loss according
to the available strategies. An example of these types of game representation of trip
planning is the work of Colony in [50]. In this work, a traveller is playing against the
nature, represented by traffic flow, which has an effect on the driver’s tension. When
the flow increases, the tension also increases along with the traveller’s losses. The
outcome of this game is expected to be in the form of Nash equilibrium. In [51], Bell
describes a zero-sum game in which the traveller is playing against an evil entity. The
game involves using certain routes as strategies. The travellers attempt at achieving
his/her goal by choosing the best routes, while the evil entity is intent on maximizing
the trip cost by maximizing the cost of some of these routes. The player and the
evil entity can only guess each other’s actions and behave accordingly. The goal is
to find a mixed Nash equilibrium; a point at which neither the evil entity nor the
traveller is able to maximize/minimize the total trip cost. The solution for this game
is formulated as the following: for the probability of link i to be chosen, pi, and the
probability of scenario j in which qj and hk represent the probability of path k to
be chosen, link i has the cost value of cij, and path k has the cost value of gkj. In
addition, we have
C =
∑
ij
pi ∗ cij ∗ qj (2.10)
where C is the expected trip cost.
If C∗ is the solution for the traveller and D is the solution for the evil entity, they
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can be found using linear programming as the following:
min
hk
C∗ (2.11)∑
k
gkj ∗ hk − C ≤ 0 (2.12)∑
k
hk = 1 (2.13)
hk ≥ 0, ∀, k (2.14)
and
max
qi
D (2.15)∑
j
gkj ∗ qj −D ≤ 0 (2.16)∑
j
qj = 1 (2.17)
qj ≥ 0, ∀, j (2.18)
The next section investigates parts of the literature regarding cooperative trip
planning.
2.6 Cooperative Trip Planning
In cooperative trip planning games, it is possible for the players to negotiate their
policies and strategies and to ultimately establish an enforceable agreement. The key
issue is the distribution of the rewards/cost among the players. Other issues include
the formulation of the game and definition the players. For example, if the game is
represented by a graph, players might be assumed to be situated along the vertices or
the edges to denote their ownership of these vertices or edges. The ownership of these
resources should limit, the problem of competitiveness between players. Certainly,
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players may share the ownership of some resources. Through the addressing of these
two issues, another problem related to mechanism of creating a group of players can
be addressed. These issues are discussed in this section a particular focus on concepts
such as the balancedness of a game and its convexity. A game is balanced if its core
is a non empty one; and a game is totally balanced if every sub game has a non
empty core. The core of a trip planning game is also investigated in this section.
Furthermore, several examples of known trip planning games are reviewed in this
section in order to stress the aforementioned concepts of balancedness and revenue
sharing. The following section commences by reviewing examples of shortest path
games.
2.6.1 Shortest Path Games
The shortest path problem as reviewed earlier is a 5-tuple problem Σ = (E,V ,L,s,t).
It has five main elements: 1) the starting point s; 2) the ending point t; 3) the set
of nodes V ; 4) the set of edges E; and 5) the link cost or simply its length L. The
network is represented by a directed graph G(E, V ).
In [52], Fragnelli et al. presented a class of shortest path games as the following:
in this game, edges in the set E are owned by a finite set of players N according to
the following mapping: o : E → N such that o(e) = i (i.e., player i owns the edge
e). Now, for a path P , a set of players owning nodes in this path is denoted by o(P ).
Players can send goods on their owned paths to generate a gain value of g. If there
is a coalition, S ⊂ N , that owns a path, such that o(P ) ⊂ S transfers goods along
its own paths to generate a gain, g, then the shortest path cooperative situation, σ,
can be defined as a 4-tuple game, (E,N, o, g). The gain of a coalition is represented
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by the following characteristic function:
vσ(S) =
{
g − LS Ls < g
0 otherwise
(2.19)
where LS is the distance, which can be viewed as the cost of the paths owned by the
coalition S, and vσ(S) is the characteristic function of the Transferable Utility (TU)
game.
The above described game is shown to coincide with a class of monotonic games
in which larger coalitions have larger gains. This outcome will lead to a situation in
which the core is found to be empty- the game is deemed to be imbalanced. Fur-
thermore, since monotonic games are not guaranteed to be balanced, two restrictions
were imposed to prove the balancedness of the shortest path game: 1) For σ and
(N, vσ) to be non-trivial, σ has to have profitable paths, vσ > 0. . In other words, for
all games, g ∈ [0,+∞). 2) Let σ be a non-trivial set in which a shortest-veto (s-veto)
player is a player ∈ N who owns at least a node in every shortest path in Σ. In other
words, for player i, v(N/i) = 0. V is a set of s-veto players. A game is balanced if
V is not empty and every profitable path of σ has a node owned by an s-veto player.
These two strong restrictions have to be imposed in order to have a balanced shortest
path game. In this game, the gain is not associated with the players but rather with
the coalitions.
In [53], Voorneveld and Grahn have presented a shortest path game in which
each player has a reward. The shortest path problem can be described as a 5-tuple
game (N, V, (Ai)i∈N , w, (ri)i∈N) where for a player, i, Ai ⊆ V × V is a directed arc
in the network, and V is a set representing all nodes in the network including s and
t. (wi)i∈N denotes the cost of using a link in the network by player i. (ri)i∈N is a
reward assigned for a player i where ri ∈ R+. Many differences are found between
this definition of the shortest path game and the one in [52]. In [53], players own
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vertices vs edges in [52]. Furthermore, an edge in [53] can have more than one owner.
The shortest path game (N, v) is defined as:
∀S ∈ 2N \ {∅} : v(S) = max {r(S)− c(S), 0} (2.20)
This game is monotonic. Thus, to achieve the non-triviality, the following assumption
is made:
0 < c(N) < r(N) (2.21)
This assumption implies that the reward of the grand coalition is greater than the
cost incurred by the coalition’s trip, S ∈ 2N \ {∅}. The cost of the coalition S that
uses path P can be computed as the following:
cost(p) =
m−1∑
k=1
w(ik, (vk, vk+1)). (2.22)
c(S) =
{
minp∈P (S) cost(P ) ifP (S) 6= ∅
∞ otherwise (2.23)
The core is defined in this work as:
C(N, v) =
{
x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N
xi(N) = v(N) and
∑
i∈S
xi(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ∈ 2N \∅
}
(2.24)
2.6.2 Travelling Salesman Games
Travelling salesman games have received significant attention as a routing game due
to its popularity in the operational research studies. In [54], Potters et al. describe a
fixed route travelling salesman game in which a round trip from s to t is attempted
while dividing the total trip cost among the participating players. If this game has a
non empty core, then a solution for the traditional travelling salesman problem can
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be found. The core for this game is defined as
Ck(c) =
{
x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N
xi(N) = ck(N) and
∑
i∈S
xi(S) ≤ ck(S), ∀S ∈ 2N \∅
}
(2.25)
If ck is the cyclic trip cost from the home city s and the city k, the core allocation
x = {x1, x2, , , , xk} has to satisfy the condition that xk ≤ ck and
∑
i∈N xi = ck(N).
This game has no apparent reward. Sponsors pay at most the cost for the trip from
the home to the destination city in a form of a reward. The routes in these games
are predefined which means that the players in the coalitions have no choice but
to leave their coalition in order to form a better one. In [55], Estevez-Fernandez
et al. proposed a similar game with a reward sharing scheme that has the core
as defined in Equation 2.24. An interesting theorem presented in this paper states
that all travelling salesman games with revenues have a non-empty core, given that
the conditions of rationality and efficiency exist. However, these conditions do not
guarantee the uniqueness of the solution.
Moreover, in nearly all these games, the number of players is an important factor
contributing positively or negatively to the balancedness of a game. For example,
the game in [54] is shown to be balanced for only 3 players. In [55], the number of
players for which the game is guaranteed not to have an empty core is not explicitly
indicated. Nevertheless, numerical examples show that a non-empty core exists for
3-player and 4-player games. Furthermore, in [56], Borm et al. demonstrated the
example of a travelling salesman game in which the game might have an empty core
for 6 players.
One of the most important issues in cooperative games with distributed costs/revenues
is the question of how to assign the revenue/cost among players in the grand coalition
N . Shapley value is an approach that allows for the distribution of the costs among
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players in certain coalitions while satisfying the following conditions: 1) efficiency,
2) symmetry, 3) additivity, and 4) the irrelevant player property [52]. The Shapley
value is computed for player, i, as follows:
Φi(N, v) =
1
N !
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(|N | − |S| − 1)![v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)] (2.26)
Shapley value is computed such that when a player i participates in a game, his/her
average contribution is [v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)]. This value is multiplied by the possible
ways in which a coalition can be sorted without having the player as a part of it. This
value is multiplied by the possible ways in which a coalition can be sorted without
having player i being as a member. The result is then multiplied by the possible ways
of creating a coalition excluding i and S ((|N | − |S| − 1)!). The Shapley value is
the average of all collations’ contributions. For every convex game, a Shapley value
always exists in the core.
2.6.3 Bargaining Games
The discussion thus far has focused on the solutions for cooperative games with side
payments (i.e., transferable utilities). However, it remains to be determined how these
solutions can be found. An applicable model that will be used in this thesis to solve
the team mobility game is the bargaining game model.
The bargaining model is one of the earliest solution models in cooperative games
described by Nash in [57] and later extended by extended by the same author in [58].
In this model, rational players will present their sets of anticipations and attempts
to reach a satisfactory agreement. Nash described a threat model by which, in 2-
person games, each player has an anticipation that he/she wishes to satisfy, while
weighing the threat posed by the other player. Both players will exchange their
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threats in the form of mixed strategies. The players then cease all communications
and act independently. If the players find themselves in a situation in which they
can retaliate against the opposing party’s threat and satisfy their anticipation, then
a point of agreement is found. The threat is used to enforce an agreement. Nash’s
model was extended to an n-person bargaining game by Harsanyi in [59]. In his
work, Harsanyi suggested that players could be grouped in syndicates (commonly
referred to as coalitions). Each syndicate accommodates a group of players who
agree to maximize the syndicate’s overall interest. This model uses mixed strategies
as threats which the players use against any player who might jeopardize the gain
of the syndicate. Various extensions of Nash’s bargaining model can be found in the
literature in order to resolve the scenario where there is incomplete information [60] or
to alter some of Nash’s axioms. For instance, In [61], Kali and Smorodinsky replaced
the axiom of independence and irrelevant alternatives with the monotonicity axiom.
Recently, in [62], Hart and Mas-Colell proposed a commitment procedure for
the bargaining game. They argued that in Non Transferable Utility (NTU) games,
coalitions might be difficult to construct due to the possibility that each player cannot
gain more rewards or pay less cost in comparison to other players. This argument
can be refuted if on the basis that solution in bargaining games “does not exclude
cases where, in the end, only one individual could have benefited because the ‘fair
bargain’ might consist of an agreement to use a probability method to decide who
is to gain in the end. Any probability combination of available anticipations is an
available anticipation.” [57]. Furthermore, contrary to the theorem presented by
Estevez-Fernandez et al. in [55] concerning side payments, the effect of side payments
on the final outcomes is another possible action in the bargaining game. Thus, the
lack of a side payment in a game should not diminish the possibility of forming a
coalition or finding a solution for the game.
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2.6.4 Congestion Games
Congestion games, first described by Rosenathal in [63], are potential games in which
players’ payoffs are affected by the resources they own and the sharing status of these
resources. As more players share the same resources, the efficiency of these resources
decreases. For instance, routes between two points are shared by the travellers. As
more travellers use the same routes, the delay times increase accordingly.
Congestion games in this sense are usually viewed as non-cooperative games and
used in the analysis of the price of anarchy and the price of stability for the network.
However, recently, a cooperative approach to solve this problem started to gain atten-
tion in the literature. In [64], Hayrapetyan described a model in which players who
share the resources, i.e., the routes, start forming coalitions. Various coalitions are
formed on this basis start to selfishly compete to maximize their objective functions.
The aim is that if coalitions were able to maximize the welfare of their participants,
the over all gains will outweigh the individual losses. In [65], Fotakis discusses the
similarity of cooperative congestion games with their non-cooperative counterparts
while demonstrating important issues such as the existence of perfect Nash equilib-
rium (PNE) and the convergence of the final solution. Cooperative congestion games
share similarities with Harsanyi’s bargaining models, and the only difference is the
method by which a coalition (syndicate) is created.
2.7 Behavioural Driven Trip Planning
The analysis of the human behavioural impact on the process of trip planning can not
be extricated from the analysis of team trip planning and selfish planning. Therefore,
understanding the various underlying factors affecting the behaviours involved in trip
planning and their influence on the entire process is of paramount importance.
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A number of researchers have outlined the effect of travellers’ experience and
behaviour on trip planning and the available planning alternatives. Ben-Akiva et al.
describe in [66] a model that conceptualizes the dynamic behaviour of the drivers. In
this model, travellers identify their trip goals in the form of trip times, trip destination,
and budgetary constraints. These goals are processed based on decision rules in
order to produce a single suggestion. This model would assist in predicting the
traveller’s behaviour-driven impact on traffic according to the available information.
In [67], Adler et al. presented a methodological model based on conflict arousal and
motivation to analyze the en-route driver’s behaviour, and its subsequent impact on
traffic. In [68], Feng and Mingzhe described a traveller-behaviour analysis model
that utilizes the Bayesian theory and the decision field theory to predict and explain
the traveller’s behaviour based on his/her routing preferences. The preferences are
limited to one criterion per route such as speed and distance.
Arentaze presented in [69] an adaptive personalized travel information system that
models an Advanced Traveller Information System (ATIS) system to respond to the
traveller’s preference. The model uses Bayesian based method to approximate the in-
dividual preferences of each driver based on repetitive sampling. The estimation unit
is central and is tasked to deal with multiple inquiries simultaneously. Further efforts
were made to model the ATISs according to the behaviour of travellers. For instance,
in [70], Jufen and Guiyan presented a navigation model that identifies possible routes
based on their expected travel times as well as possible changes in the journey times.
User behaviour is defined by their tolerance to the changeability of journey times,
with the assumption that travellers are not pre-informed about these changes and
can only respond based on their predictions of these changes. However, this study
does not consider the fact that modern ATISs have access to online information, and
if there is a change in traffic flow, travellers will have knowledge instead of the predic-
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tion regarding the changes. Furthermore, by defining the behaviour of the travellers
in the context of their tolerance towards possible changes in the trip times, they over-
look other travel factors such as monetary budgets, comfortability, the availability
of transportation modes, safety, and route familiarity, among others. Ben-Elia and
Sheftan maintained in [71] that, in addition to the attitude towards taking risks in
trip planning, the amount, nature, and completeness of the provided information to
the travellers all play a pivotal role in the trip planning process. Travellers are more
inclined to react quickly in a rational way to the changes in the planning factors that
might affect their plans, if the correct information is provided. Rationality in [71] is
only seen as the compliance of the travellers with the best provided plan. Various
simulation studies can be found in [72], which evaluate the travellers’ decision making
process under various risk assumptions. When travellers are faced with certain risks,
their response in terms of aversion is observed. Risk is modelled in their work in terms
of information uncertainty such as the uncertainty of the arrival time. Nonetheless,
the travellers’ personal behaviour regarding the trip planning is not proactively in-
cluded in the implementation of the trip planning solution. Alternatively, most of
the available ATISs process traffic in the same manner for all travellers regardless of
their personal preferences. Subsequently, travellers who share the source and desti-
nation areas are often presented with the same advice, which generates a number of
problems [73].
The term “behaviour” in this research refers to the travellers’ personal preferences
towards routing. The satisfaction of these preferences can ultimately determine the
success of a trip. Furthermore, since travellers’ rationality should only be viewed in
terms of goal achievement, their preferences (i.e., goals), and travelling behaviours
should play a key role in deciding their routing alternatives. This behaviour-driven
planning vision is not a substitute for the existing ATISs, but it is complementary.
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The behaviour-driven planning can be seen as an additional layer between the ATIS
and the travellers, which acts as a proxy for the travellers in terms of processing the
available information.
2.8 Outstanding Issues and Motivation
There are many issues that usually arise in trip planning systems. These issues
have influenced the proposed trip planning framework. Regardless of the nature of
the trip planning approach, whether good or bad, certain issues persist. One of
these issues is the over saturation problem. This problem arises from the travellers’
mismanagement of the information regarding their trips [66]. The problem is a man-
machine interaction problem. The cognition ability and the travelling experience of
the user would affect the trip planning decision [74]. Mitigating this issue is difficult
since it is related to the amount of control the trip planning system designer needs
to give to the user. Furthermore, even with effective trip planning, some problems
are deemed to be intrinsically related to the process. Intelligent systems often make
similar decisions under similar circumstances. For instance, in a situation where
travellers are receiving accurate information about traffic in real-time, the majority
of travellers will make the accurate decision of using an alternative route with the
least amount of traffic, which will eventually cause traffic oscillation. This problem
is called the overreaction problem. There are many solutions that have been devised
to resolve this problem, one of which is to utilise the non-cooperative game trip
planning model. In this solution model, through their navigation systems, travellers
can anticipate the possible action(s) of other travellers and act accordingly [75].
Trip planning is largely dependent on real-time information and individual pref-
erences among the travellers. Thus, it is relatively acceptable to assume that most
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travellers will choose the best possible paths for their journeys. Departure times are
chosen based on their path choices and expected trip times. However, travellers with
similar preferences and who have access to the same travelling information will tend
to choose similar paths. This situation often results in congestion [66] and is generally
referred to in the literature as the concentration problem. While commenting on the
Comprehensive Automobile Traffic Control System (CACS) implemented in Japan
during 1970s, Kawashima noted in [76] that as the number of vehicles equipped with
navigation system increases, the overall traffic management efficiency decreases. The
reported navigation systems provided route suggestions based on the shortest route
approach. This observation can be extended to the more recent and advanced trip
planning systems. Ben-Akiva suggested in [66] that some form of directive planning
could be beneficial in reducing this problem. Directive routing can be achieved most
effectively through central systems. Nevertheless, this solution has been shown to be
impractical and virtually infeasible. In [77], Chang et al. suggested that the travelling
options should be diversified so that drivers can choose from alternative paths from
the same source to the same destination.
The overreaction problem and the concentration problem may seem similar, al-
though this is far from the reality. The overreaction problem is a situation-pertinent
event. Once a triggering condition is established, such as congestion or safety haz-
ards, the rationality of the system will create the overreaction problem. On the other
hand, the concentration problem is the natural outcome of using a rational intelli-
gent system. Intelligent systems are one of the reasons that congestion exists, where
the overreaction is caused by events such as congestion. The resolution of these three
problems exemplifies the goal of the research in this thesis. In order to avoid the over-
saturation problem, the trip planning system must be able to incorporate cognitional
ability and human expertise to influence the trip planning decision. Furthermore, to
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avoid the problems of both overreaction and concentration, the trip planning system
should be capable of correctly anticipating the actions of other travellers or allowing
them to coordinate among themselves in order to appropriately direct the traffic and
avoid congestion. Furthermore, to deal with the various team mobility problems, any
solution has to view the problem as a resource sharing problem. The developed frame-
work in this research is designed to achieve a cooperative trip planning system that is
both rational and influenced by the travellers’ preferences and demands. Moreover,
the framework is designed to address the problem as a resource sharing problem that
can be solved through competition between travellers or cooperation between groups
of travellers, when applicable.
2.9 Summary
This chapter covered a wide range of topics related to trip planning. Two areas
of research were discussed, namely pure optimization-based trip planning and game
theoretic-based trip planning. For each area, a background survey was conducted and
a variety of trip planning problems were reviewed in terms of problem formulation,
solution modelling, as well as the existence and the stability of the final solution.
There are several similarities between some of the reviewed trip planning games
and the problem investigated in this thesis. These similarities have assisted in the de-
velopment of the mathematical formulation of the team trip planning game. However,
to the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no existing research on cooperative
trip planning that suggests a functional framework that addresses the problem of
team trip planning from the stage of trip inquiry through to the stage of trip decision
making; a framework that handles tasks such as trip information gathering, initial
trip planning, and conflict identification and resolution. The work in this thesis aims
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to construct a fully workable solution that resolves these issues using a unified frame-
work that consists of multiple modules, while also addressing the theoretical issues
covered in this literature review.
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Team Mobility Planning: A Game
Theoretic Approach1
3.1 Introduction
Trip planning games have, to a large extent, been regarded in the literature as non-
cooperative games. In nearly all instances of such a representation, the travellers are
treated as a passive component of the game: the aim is only to analyze and optimize
the environment’s resources. This does not mean that using the cooperative approach
is a futile endeavour. It is indeed more challenging and exceedingly more complicated
to implement. However, with efficient planning, this approach can yield positive
results. The rationale is that cooperation is an integral part of the evolution of nearly
all aspects of technology and problem solving. The team-trip planning problem is no
exception to this rule.
In this chapter, I view the team trip planning game as a cooperative game of
competing travellers. I describe a team trip planning game in which travellers ini-
tially, selfishly, aim to plan a trip that matches their needs considering the state of
1The research work in this chapter has appeared in part in [78]
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the existing environment. I demonstrate that the selfish but rational choices of var-
ious travellers could be detrimental to the other travellers’ optimality. I argue that,
through negotiation, each traveller may eventually profit either by improving upon
his/her individual optimum gain or, at a minimum, by retaining his/her individual
optimum gain. A multi-module framework named Team Mobility Planning (TMP)
is described in this chapter.
3.2 Team Trip Planning: Problem and Model De-
scription
3.2.1 Problem Formulation
Consider a group of N travellers, TR = {tr1, tr2, ., tri, ., trN}, in which a traveler tri
is contemplating a trip from an initial location stri to a final destination f tri . Traveler
tri can make the trip by following path p
tri ∈ P tri . P tri denotes the feasible paths
between stri to f tri that are available to tri. There is a certain cost value c
tri associated
with each path ptri . ctri is a function of several factors including transportation modals
used to complete the trip (e.g, public vs private), environmental conditions along the
path, as well as traffic conditions. The notion of cost in this work is multi-aspect,
in the sense that it explicitly quantifies monetary costs, temporal costs, safety costs,
and comfort costs, to the extent that a multi-criteria cost formulation is employed to
facilitate the trip route optimization process. The concept of doctrine is introduced to
capture travellers’ preferences, demands, and constraints. For each path ptri , we use
γtri to denote traveler tri’s doctrine for this path. Γ
tri denotes the set of all doctrines
associated with tri’s feasible paths P
tri . The traveler tri’s desirable route can then
be stated as
ptriOpt = Min
∀ptrik ∈P tri
Υ(stri , f tri ,Γtri) (3.1)
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where Υ represents a selfish selection process by which an optimum path is chosen.
ptrik represents a possible path, and P
tri represents the set of all paths. A selfish
selection process is a process in which the drivers attempt to maximize their benefits
regardless of the impact of their chosen actions on the system- negatively or positively.
For N travellers, their interaction process and their travelling decisions must be
formulated such that optimizing traveller tri’s plan does not negatively impact other
travellers’, tr−i, chosen routes. To deal with these kinds of interactions, we define a
team trip planning game. The team trip planning game, Σ, is a 4-tuple (G, Γtri , stri ,
f tri) such that:
• G is a directed acyclic graph that includes all possible routes, P tri . For each
traveller tri, s
tri and f tri are defined.
• Γtri is a traveller selfish assessment process which assigns a non-negative value
to each road segment, lpkj , denoting the cost of this segment.
A solution set of paths P tri is defined for the game Σ such that each path, ptrik
connecting stri and f tri , is composed of connected links l
p
tri
k
j | lp
tri
k
j ∈ Lp
tri
k . The cost of
these paths is ctripk = Σ
|Lp
tri
k |
j=1 l
p
tri
k
j ∗ξr, where ξr is a weight value that reflects the degree of
preference that each traveller has for a certain path. For the mobility planning game
Σ, traveller tri has an ordered set of strategies:
{
P tri : P tri =
{
ptri1 , p
tri
2 , , , , p
tri
n
}}
in
which
{
ptrik  ptri−k : ptrik = ptriOpt for tri
}
. Travellers own road segments, lpkj s, according
to a mapping function o : Lpk → TR such that o(lpkj ) = tri (i.e., road segment lpkj is
chosen by traveler tri as a possible path). For any path, pk, o(L
pk
S ) is a set of connected
segments satisfying certain travelling criteria and owned by a group of travellers.
Suppose that for each traveller tri there is a travelling cost c
tri
pk
and mobility plan-
ning reward DtriRpk
. Both cost and reward values are non-negative,
{
ctripk , D
tri
Rpk
∈ R+
}
,
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and they belong to the same currency domain. For example, if the reward is monetary,
the cost should be also monetary. For DtriRpk
> ctripk , traveller tri is able to generate
profit. Furthermore, assume that a group of travellers, i.e., coalition S ⊂ N , through
certain agreements, can generate a profit using only paths P S owned by the coalition
through certain agreements; for example, the set of paths P is owned by a coalition S
if o(P ) ⊂ S. A situation in which there exists a successful team trip plan is called a
team trip planning game (N, vσ). vσ is a characteristic function for this game, which
is computed as follows:
vσ(S) =
{
ζ(cSP , DRS) if S owns P
S ∈ Σ, and ζ(cSP , DRS) > 0
0 otherwise
(3.2)
Where ζ is the mapping function which associates every coalition S with a non-
negative value according to cSP and DRS .
The cost of each path, ctripk , for traveller tri, is not independent from its reward
value, DtriRpk
. Thus, it is necessary to define a positive function, for the coalition S,
that defines the relationship between cSP and DPRS . Furthermore, assume that the
ctriP 6= c
tr(−i)
P and D
tri
Rpk
6= Dtr(−i)Rpk . This game should be considered a game with Non-
Transferable Utility (N-TU). In this cooperative game, the solution, i.e., the core, is
described as follows:
core =
{
x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N
xi(N) = v(N) and
∑
i∈S
xi(S) ≥ v(S) ∀S ∈ 2N \∅
}
(3.3)
where
∑
i∈N xi(N) = v(N) guarantees the efficiency of the outcome, and
∑
i∈S xi(S) ≥
v(S) ∀S ∈ 2N \∅ guarantees the stability of the game.
Furthermore, each traveller, tri, has a set of strategies based on which the decision
of the best path, ptrik , can be obtained. For each traveller, tri, there is a finite non-
empty set of actions, paths, P tri . For each path, there is a payoff or a utility function
41
CHAPTER 3. TEAM MOBILITY PLANNING: A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH
u, such that u: P tri → R. Paths in P tri are associated with preference relation %
such that u(ptrii ) ≥ u(ptrij ) if ptrii % ptrij . Cost functions and rewards can correspond to
utility values, and the ordering of P tri is conducted through the knowledge of %(tri).
Moreover, P tri can be expanded to include a non-route related actions. The chosen
departure and the expected arrival times for a trip can be considered as strategic
actions, which might change the outcome of the game. For traveller, tri, P
tri can
be ordered according to %(tri) such that ptrik is better than ptrik+1 iff u(ptrik ) ≥ u(ptrik+1).
This game is described as (N,P, u) game.
3.2.2 Team Trip Planning Model Formulation
For each traveller, tri, the problem of finding the best route can now be stated as
follows: Given a graph G = (V,E), where V is the set of all nodes (vertices) in the
graph, and E denotes all edges in the graph. The graph represents an area of interest
P (stri , f tri) that includes the starting point stri and the destination point f ti . This
area of interest is defined prior to the commencement of the team trip planning game
in order to limit the search space, as shown in Figure 3.1 .
The goal is to find the best path, ptrxOpt for traveller trx with minimum cost value, ξr,
for n travelling options such that ptrxOpt ∈
{
ptrx1 , p
trx
2 , , , p
trx
n
}
. Based on the preferences-
based ordering, ptrxOpt = p
trx
1 . The multi criteria team trip planning problem is formu-
lated to reflect Equation 3.1 such that
ptrxk = min
∑
∀i,j∈E
ξrij xij (3.4)
which can be described as a minimum cost optimization problem. The paths with
the minimum cost can be ranked in order of the incurred cost. The cost values can
be subjective and vary from one traveller to another.
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(a) Road network map covers the area of interest taken from Google Maps.
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(b) A schematic graph corresponding to the road network of interest.
Figure 3.1: Mapping a satellite map to graph based on the area of interest.
For a team of travellers, {tr1, tr2, , , , , trN}, an indication of common interest is
the utility function U = ω(η, ptr1i , p
tr2
j , , , , p
trN
n ) where ω is a concave function that
is differentiable over ptrij s such that p
tri
j ∈ P tri . η is the state of the environment
and corresponds to a value computed based on trip attributes such that ω(η, ptrij ) =
utri(pj). In the best case scenario, the actions of each traveller are independent
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from the actions of other travellers and do not affect the state of the world (i.e.,
ηtr1(tr2, tr3, , , trN) = η
tr1) such that
U =
∑
i,j
ω(ηtri , ptrij ) (3.5)
The formulation in Equation 3.5 corresponds with v(N) = v(s) : s = SGND in
Equation 3.3. Where SGND is the grand coalition that includes all travellers.
The optimization problem should be defined as being user-centric with user-
specific constraints. Therefore, there is no guarantee that a conflict-free outcome
will emerge. Furthermore, conflicts can sometimes occur regardless of the abundance
of existing paths. For example, if one path is more attractive than the other paths,
most drivers will choose this path, thus resulting in conflicts. Nevertheless, it is im-
portant to note that the drivers make their decisions independently from each other,
such that the rationality of these decisions is not compromised. Once the drivers
arrive at their own personal decisions, the developed cooperative solution offers a
procedure by which their conflicts are mitigated. The developed framework is capa-
ble of solving each traveller’s mobility problem, according to the objective function
defined in Equation 3.4, and of the determining of the proper team arrangement such
that U is maximized or minimized depending on the application. Additionally, this
process, includes an appropriate definition of the relationship between the travellers
and the impact of each traveller on the others’ expected outcomes.
Example
To illustrate the trip planning problem, consider the following scenario in which only
two travellers are driving within the same area and heading to the same destination. In
this scenario, according to our problem formulation, these two drivers have different
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concerns, preferences, and understandings regarding their preferred routes. Thus,
the cost of using each road segment is dependent on the driver, as seen in Figure 3.2.
Assume that the factors, other than the traffic, contributing to the cost are fixed for
this trip and do not change throughout the duration of the trip. Furthermore, if the
traffic increases by 1 vehicle, the cost increases by 3 points for both drivers.
For traveller tr1, P
(tr1) =
{
p
(tr1)
1 , p
(tr1)
2 , , , , p
(tr1)
n
}
such that
s t
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C
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Figure 3.2: Example of two competing travellers.
p
(tr1)
1 = s→ A→ C → B → t (3.6)
p
(tr1)
2 = s→ A→ C → t (3.7)
.
.
p
(tr1)
n−1 = s→ C → D → E → t (3.8)
p(tr1)n = s→ D → E → t (3.9)
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and for tr2, P
(tr2) =
{
p
(tr2)
1 , p
(tr2)
2 , , , , p
(tr2)
n
}
such that:
p
(tr2)
1 = s→ D → C → B → t (3.10)
p
(tr2)
2 = s→ D → C → t (3.11)
.
.
p
(tr2)
n−1 = s→ A→ C → E → t (3.12)
p(tr2)n = s→ D → E → C → t (3.13)
The price model for this example consists of two components: the individual price
as per user and the price incurred due to the conflict. Therefore, implicitly for this
example, the order of preference is established according to the cost. Rationally, both
travellers would choose a preferred path ptrkOpt = p
trk
1 , for k = 1, 2. However, if they
meet at point C at the same time, the cost of the next segment will increase by 3
points if it is selected by both. If one of them used the segment prior to the other
traveller, the cost for the other traveller would increase. Hence, one of them at least
will have his/her plan de-optimized. In the worst case scenario, with no agreement or
negotiation, both travellers will choose C → B → t and the overall cost will increase
by 6 points. For both travellers, many of the less desirable paths would be cheaper.
This example is relatively simple, and the cost increase might not be significant.
Nonetheless, scaling this example up to N travellers and to many other types of cost
factors will result in a significantly more negative scenario. A solution for this example
may lead to the necessity to find an agreement such that one traveller will transfer the
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ownership of p1 to the other traveller in exchange of some form of compensation. In
this case, tr1 and tr2 have formed a coalition based on mutual interest. Furthermore,
the set Atrk can include possible starting trip times. A change in one of the traveller’s
starting times may avert the possibility of both travellers using the same segment
at the same time. If this choice is to be made independently by each traveller, this
would be a non-cooperative game.
3.3 Team Mobility Planning (TMP) Framework
To address the team trip planning game and its variety of potential classes, a multi-
module framework is developed along the lines of the defined team trip planning
game, as depicted in Figure 3.3. This framework is a conceptual description of how
the team trip planning game will be handled, while addressing various game theoretic
issues. Some of these issues are as follows:
• One of the most important conditions of game theory is the assumption that all
players are rational. Rational players aim to optimize their objective function(s)
based on pre-defined criteria.
• Effective trip planning that is influenced by the traveller’s personal preferences
is a challenging process to model. In the developed framework, trip planning is
a traveller-centric process. Human expertise and understanding is incorporated
into the process.
• The developed framework should have a mechanism that can be used for the
identification of potential participants in the trip planning game.
To address these challenges, among others, the following description of the developed
multi-module framework is presented:
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Figure 3.3: Schematic of the Team Mobility Planning (TMP) Framework.
3.3.1 Cooperative Trip Planning Module
In this module, the final trip planning decisions are made. The route assignment,
the resource allocation, and the final cooperative operations are also performed. This
module deploys the bargaining game as a cooperative approach to resolve the conflicts
between the travellers. The cooperation notion is held under the strong assumption
that there is always a binding agreement between the travellers and the coalition (i.e.,
once a final decision is made, all travellers affected by that decision will, with no ex-
ception, follow through with their agreed upon actions). Furthermore, in conjunction
with the team formation module, the process of coalition creation is implemented.
The creation of coalitions is achieved primarily by means of negotiation between the
travellers.
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3.3.2 Team Formation Module
This module represents the existence of a medium through which the drivers are
identified as travellers and as such, can be grouped into coalitions. Their preferences,
interests, geographical proximity, and their threats against each other are moderated
through the medium. The team consisting of all travellers defined in this module is
named the Grand Coalition. The other smaller coalitions are defined in the coopera-
tive trip planning module.
In this developed work, the travellers are using vehicles for the purposes of their
commutes. Maps are represented by graphs G in which the optimum route is found.
Within the process of finding the optimum route, there may be the necessity to form
team(s) to broaden the search space. For instance, in Figure 3.1(b) travellers in the
road segments denoted by link j and link k might want to cooperate to discuss their
strategies as they could share the same intersection and thus cause congestion.
3.3.3 Traveller-Centric Trip Planning Module
In this module, a Traveller-Centric Trip Planning (TCTP) system is deployed to
provide the traveller tri with a set of feasible solutions P
tri . As indicated in the
Equation 3.1, each path has its own payoff function ui. These paths are ordered
based on their payoff values. These strategies are formulated and ordered in the
TCTP module as doctrines, Γtri . For each chosen path p(Γtri), there exists a doctrine
satisfaction index DSr , which is used with the cost of the chosen path to define the
utility function ui.
The TCTP module is the first stage of the trip planning process. It is designed
such that the travellers are rationally making decision and prioritizing alternatives
for existing plans based on the forecast profits or losses. The rationality condition
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is handled/guaranteed by this module. By adjusting the monetary and temporal
constraints, this module will produce multiple paths and multiple utility values which
can be used later in the cooperative game.
3.4 Summary
This chapter presented a problem formulation for the team trip planning problem.
The problem formulation describes the problem from a single traveller’s perspective,
as well as the interaction between multiple travellers. The team trip planning problem
is described as a cooperative game. A mathematical formulation for the solution
model was also developed in this chapter. According to the solution formulation, a
Team Mobility Planning (TMP) framework was developed. This framework consists
of three modules to cover the aspects of cooperative decision making, team formation,
and the traveller’s rational planning.
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Chapter 4
Cooperative Trip Planning:
Bargaining Based Approach1
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, the trip planning game is formulated as a cooperative game. In this
chapter, I emphasize the notion of cooperation and provide analytical propositions to
discuss the balancedness and stability of the described game. The balancedness of a
game reflects the existence of a solution for that game. A solution model is presented
in this chapter and is further demonstrated using experimental scenarios.
4.2 Balancedness of Team Trip Planning Game
An integral part of developing a solution for any game is the understanding of the
characteristics of the game. The most important aspect of any game is its balanced-
ness and stability. In cooperative games, balancedness refers to the existence of at
least one coalition of travellers for which the individual outcomes are more than or
equal to the gains outside of the coalition. In other words, a game is balanced if it
1The research work in this chapter has appeared in part in [78]
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has a non-empty core. For non-cooperative games, stability is usually used to refer to
the existence of at least one equilibrium. This difference between these two concepts
is simple and can facilitate general understanding of the research related to them.
Certainly, the term stability can be also extended to the cooperative games [79].
Both terms, the balancedness and the stability of the game, correspond to the
possibility of having a solution for the game. Thus, if a game is balanced/stable,
there is at least one self-enforcing or externally enforced outcome for the game that
conforms to the rules of balancedness and stability. This section addresses the is-
sue of solution convergence at the end of the game. The challenge is to prove the
balancedness of the team trip planning game without defining the rules governing
the coalition interaction process or conceptualizing the game environment. However,
these issues will be intentionally left open at this juncture. Alternatively, to prove
the balancedness of the developed game, both the cooperative and non-cooperative
sides of this game will be approached.
In general, the non-cooperative game can be described as a general form of coop-
erative games. Many non-cooperative games have some form of interaction between
travellers and indeed, cooperation. In exchanging information prior to the game and
revealing their payoffs, travellers are cooperating to a certain extent. In fact, it was
proposed that the competitive non-cooperative equilibrium is a part of the coopera-
tive solution- the core [80]. Using this argument, the first proposition of this thesis
can be stated.
Proposition 4.2.1. If the non-cooperative version of a cooperative game has an equi-
librium, this equilibrium is a part of the core and the cooperative game is balanced. In
other words, the stability of a non-cooperative game is a proof of the balancedness of
its cooperative counterpart and
∑
i∈S xi(S) ≥ v(S) ∀S ∈ 2N \∅.
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Given that there is a solution for the trip planning optimization function, each
traveller will have an equilibrium. Their chosen actions are considered pure strategies,
and pure equilibria may exist. This equilibrium refers to an outcome where traveller
wishes to unilaterally change his/her optimized solution (A detailed proof is found
in [81]). This is true for non-strictly competitive games. As the game progresses,
travellers may compete to gain resources to the point that one traveller’s gain is
another traveller’s loss, (i.e., a zero-sum game). This can be overcome if trip re-
planning is allowed, which leads to the the following definition and the subsequent
proposition.
Definition 4.2.1. A traveller-centric mobility planning game is a game in which
each traveller performs trip re-planning every t time. There is a probability pk that
the traveller will proceed according to the previous plan or (1 − pk) that he/she will
move to a different plan (i.e., adopt different strategy). pk is distributed over the set
of all strategies used by each traveller in this game.
Proposition 4.2.2. The mobility planning game proposed in Definition 4.2.1 is a
mixed game for which at least one mixed equilibrium always exists.
Proposition 4.2.2 is made with accordance to Nash’s definition of mixed strat-
egy equilibria in [82]. Furthemore, based on Proposition 4.2.1, Definition 4.2.1, and
Proposition 4.2.2, it can be stated that the cooperative team planning game has at
least one solution set in its core, meaning that the game is balanced. That solution
set in the core corresponds to the solution of the mixed Nash equilibrium. Although
there are other factors that are often studied when analyzing a cooperative game
(such as the investigation of all possible sub-games to determine if a game is com-
pletely balanced as well as the investigation of the nucleus of a game), for the purpose
of the research in this thesis, the important issue is the existence of a solution. This
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has been established by proving the stability and the balancedness of the described
game.
Even if a solution for a game exists, the discovery of that solution could prove to
be challenging. The next section describes a bargaining model which is developed as
a solution platform for the team trip planning game.
4.3 Bargaining Based Trip Planning Game
Bargaining models are interesting in the sense that some parts of the literature work
view them as non-cooperative games [60], while other parts regard them as coop-
erative games [59, 83, 84]. Thus, the relationship between the cooperative and non-
cooperative solution, used for our proof of balancedness/stability, is clearly prominent
in this model.
Traveller-Based 
Trip Planning 
State of the 
environment 
Traveller-Based 
Trip Planning
Traveller-Based 
Trip Planning 
Bargaining 
Unit
Bargaining 
Unit
Bargaining 
Unit
X1
X2
Xn
P, U
P, U
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Coalition Formation 
Through Pairwise 
Bargaining 
Bargaining Offer
Bargaining 
Offer
Bargaining Offer
Figure 4.1: Game theoretic framework using the bargaining model.
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As aforementioned, a solution for a cooperative game is represented by its core.
However, as noted in Chapter 2, there is the problem of finding the elements of the
core. In this research work, a bargaining model can be used as a tool for revenue-
sharing and cost-allocation (i.e., the bargaining model should provide us with elements
of the core). The bargaining model is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The Bargaining Model
1: procedure Coalition–Creation
2: Broadcast P tri to other travellers
3: for each traveller tri do
4: Compute (|(u(trinit(p))− u(trinit(pˆ)))|)|tr−i
5: Identify a potential coalition partner
6: Compute the conflict factor (|(u(trinit(p)) − (u(trinit(pˆ)))|trresp(trresp = tri, i 6=
1))|)
7: Compute the threat factor ϑinit
8: if presp responded with an offer then
9: Compute ϑrespond
10: if ϑinit < ϑresp then
11: trinit will choose pinit = pi, i 6= 1
12: else
13: trrespwill choose presp = pi, i 6= 1
14: end if
15: Call The Negotiation Procedure
16: else
17: trinit creates a singleton coalition
18: end if
19: Broadcast P s
i
20: end for
21: end procedure
For the proposed bargaining model, it is assumed that the set of strategies P
is compact and convex. P is determined through a traveller-centric trip planning
module, as seen in Figure 4.1. Furthermore, for each possible point in P , each traveller
has a satisfactory payoff. These assumptions are important to guarantee the existence
of a solution for the bargaining game. For our game, there is 2-tuple game Σ for N-
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travellers. Σ has many sub games, Σ∗. These sub games are part of the original game
and each of which is a 2-traveller bargaining game.
If the bargaining game is defined such that travellers can accept to pay more
than what they would have paid without bargaining, then the rationality condition
is violated, which might result in a non-equilibrium solution and hence, an unstable
game. To avoid that, a strong rationality assumption is proposed as follows:
Assumption 4.3.1. For a traveller, tri, there exists a set of strategies P
tri in which
each point is less preferred than the solution ptri such that ptri ∈ P tri. During the
course of the game, Traveller tri is free to choose any strategy in P
tri which might
yield less payoff, or higher cost, than that of ptri.
The previous assumption permits any volunteer choice made by any traveller to
give in some of his/her resources to other travellers for the benefit of the group rather
than the individual. Groups of travellers engaging in these bargaining games are
called coalitions. Hence, the coalition in our game is created based on power play
rather than fairness in resource allocation. As noted in [57] and [58], Assumption
4.3.1 does not violate the rationality axiom of cooperative game theory, but it allows
for the possibility of creating a beneficial solution for all travellers.
At the beginning of the game, the travellers will list their strategies and associated
payoffs. For the conflicting strategies, Pˆ : Pˆ ⊂ P , travellers will list the actual
payoffs, caused by a conflict of interest. The traveller who has less risk when changing
his/her strategy will swerve. In this game, every traveller makes his/her strategies
known to other travellers. If there are contradicting strategies, travellers with such
contradictions start to contact each other to resolve the conflict of interest. As such,
one party will initiate the bargaining game by proposing a deal. The initiator, trinit,
will suggest that the other traveller, trresp, should swerve. Furthermore, after making
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Algorithm 2 The Negotiation Procedure
1: procedure Negotiation–Rounds
2: for each traveller tri with new strategy p
new do
3: Compute the cost ((u(tri(p))|tr−i(p))
4: if u(tri(p
new) > u(tri(p
old) then
5: if u(tri(p
j : pj 6= pnew) < u(tri(pnew) then
6: if ΣNk P
trk |(pi(trj)) ≤ ΣNk P trk |(tri(pnew)) then
7: Change strategy
8: end if
9: end if
10: else
11: Do nothing
12: end if
13: end for
14: end procedure
the strategies, the values of the payoff/cost shown will be recalculated. The deal
offered by the first party has a retaliation/threat factor ϑtrinit . ϑtrinit represents the
risk which trresp has to face when swerving. ϑ
trinit can be any mixed strategy that
trinit might use in case the negotiation was not successful. ϑ
trinit is computed as
follows:
ϑtrinit = min
Pˆ
(|(u(trinit(p))− u(trinit(pˆ))|, |u(trresp(p))− u(trresp(pˆ))|) (4.1)
The other party will check the offer and his/her available options for retaliation. If
there is another deal in which he/she has a ϑtrresp < ϑtrinit , then trinit will be the one
swerving. Each party will revisit their sets of available strategies as the negotiation
progresses until an agreement is made. If ϑtrresp = ϑtrinit , the deal offered by the
initiator will be the conclusion of the negotiation. Both parties will have a binding
agreement regarding their chosen strategies and they will update their sets of available
strategies accordingly. Communications between both parties are maintained at all
times. This negotiation process is presented as an iterative code in Algorithm 2.
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To further clarify the proposed bargaining model, the bargaining model is used to
solve the example described in Chapter 3.
4.3.1 Example 1:
In this example, two drivers working for the same company with different assigned
tasks are attempting a trip from the same source to the same destination. According
to their preferences, different paths will have different cost values. They need to
minimize both of their cost values such that the collateral cost for the company is
minimized. Obviously, both drivers need to cooperate to minimized their joint cost.
To simplify the analysis, both drivers will have only two strategies to choose from.
They start at the same time with no re-planning (i.e., they follow the path they chose
from the beginning).
s t
A
D E
B
C
4 1
1
7
1
7
2
3
1
3
1
s t
A
D E
B
C
1 1
1
7
1
7
1
3
1
3
5
Tr1 Tr2
10 10
Figure 4.2: Example of two travellers travelling in the same environment.
For traveller tr1, the chosen strategies are
p
(tr1)
1 = s→ A→ C → B → t (4.2)
p
(tr1)
2 = s→ A→ C → t (4.3)
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For traveller tr2 the chosen strategies are
p
(tr2)
1 = s→ D → C → B → t (4.4)
p
(tr2)
2 = s→ D → C → t (4.5)
When both drivers choose the same path, the price for each shared route increases
by 2 price units. In this case, traveller tr1 will communicate his/her strategies,{
p
(tr1)
1 , p
(tr1)
2
}
and the associated original costs of {−4,−5}. These prices may in-
crease to {−8,−7} if both drivers choose similar routes. tr1 offers a deal in which tr2
will choose p
(tr2)
2 , estimating ϑ
trinit = −1. tr2 has no better offer, and since he/she
did not initiate the bargaining game, the deal offered by tr1 is approved. We can
verify the optimality of their agreement by analyzing this bargaining game as non-
cooperative. If an action and response table is constructed, as shown in 4.1, it can
be seen that in the case either tr1 or tr2 chooses the best strategy, while the other
chooses the second preferred strategy, we will have an outcome of Pareto optimality.
This result is in agreement with Nash’s axioms for the bargaining game [58].
Table 4.1: Action-response table for tr1 and tr2
Traveller p
(tr2)
1 p
(tr2)
2
p
(tr1)
1 {−8,−8} {−4,−5}
p
(tr1)
2 {−5,−4} {−7,−7}
With regards to the increase in the cost value, when analyzing the traffic impact
along a path, the path price is usually represented as a function of the traffic. There
are several suggestions in the literature with regard to the path cost functions rang-
ing from linear functions to M/G/1-based representations [85]. In this chapter, for
simplicity, the increase in the cost value is restricted to a linearly added value. For
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more details, the research work in [85–87] provide great insights into the topic.
The described bargaining model so far is a 2-travellers model. In the next section,
I present a generalization to this model to become an N-traveller mobility planning
model.
4.4 N-Traveller Bargaining Game: Creating Coali-
tions
For a game of N-travellers, the set of available strategies should be in full dimension
(i.e., the number of strategies is equal to the number of travellers) [59]. In other words,
for N-travellers, each one should have a set of possible strategies in a magnitude of n.
Pairwise bargaining with every traveller can be a complicated process, and probably
an intractable one. Therefore, for a large number of travellers, it is better to have
coalitions of travellers who have already agreed on joint strategies. Forming coalitions
in which travellers share certain agreements regarding a set of actions may ease the
process of finding a global bargaining agreement. Therefore, instead of having the
required strategies for each traveller to be n = N , n can be constrained to be equal
to |Si|.
In our model, the N-traveller bargaining process is composed of a series of a parallel
2-travellers bargaining sub-games. In each sub-game, only two travellers bargain and
find their acceptable joint strategies, P%. For instance, in Example 1, a plausible set
of strategies for a coalition of (tr1, tr2) would be:
P S% =
{{
p
(tr1)
1 , p
(tr2)
2
}
,
{
p
(tr1)
2 , p
(tr2)
1
}}
(4.6)
In general, for a coalition, Si, we can define the set of available strategies for the
coalition, P Si% , as the winning strategies in the bargaining process. Moreover, each
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traveller needs to be a part of a coalition either by joining another traveller and form-
ing a coalition, or by joining an already existing coalition. Travellers join coalitions
to increase their gains or minimize their losses. Therefore, if any traveller found that
the coalition he/she joined will devalue his/her utility function, he/she can secede
from the coalition. Moreover, if there is no coalition that improves a traveller’s utility
value, then the traveller can form a singleton coalition with his/her preferred strategy.
By the end of the game, the travellers who are in single coalitions will have to join
the grand coalition, SGND, based on a binding agreement.
The developed team trip planning game is an additive game. Thus, existing
coalitions will have a utility value representing their joint gain/loss, which is computed
as follows:
uSi =
|S|∑
j
utrj . (4.7)
Each coalition will choose a representative to run the negotiation with other coalitions
or travellers. The representative is the one with the maximum risk incurred if he/she
deviates from the chosen strategies of the coalition. The bargaining is ran according
to the changes of the coalition utility value uSi . The coalition with the least risk of
loss will swerve. The coalitions that, when merged, achieve the least deviation risk
will swerve and new uSi will be computed. Furthermore, the bargaining model should
be able to accommodate a situation in which travellers do not have an action set of
a full dimension. Since our model is eventually reduced to a 2-person bargaining
game, each traveller should have at least a 2-D set of actions. The coalition-based
bargaining model is further explained in the following example.
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4.4.1 Example 2:
In this example, we have four travellers commuting along the routes shown in Figure
4.3. It is decided that no matter which path is chosen, if more than one traveller
choose the same subset of road segments, there is an extra cost of 1 price unit for
each traveller per each congested road segment. If the travellers were to choose the
least preferred path, this change of plan will incur a loss of 1 price unit. The paths
available for each traveller are indicated as the following:
ptr11 = b→ d→ f → j → p→ q (4.8)
ptr12 = a→ s→ c→ i→ l→ r (4.9)
ptr21 = b→ d→ f → j → p→ q (4.10)
ptr22 = a→ s→ c→ i→ k → p→ q → r (4.11)
ptr31 = b→ c→ i→ k → p→ q (4.12)
ptr32 = a→ s→ c→ i→ k → p→ q → r (4.13)
ptr41 = b→ c→ i→ k → p→ q (4.14)
ptr42 = a→ s→ c→ i→ k → p→ q → r (4.15)
The game progresses according to Algorithm 1 and 2. For tr1, the traveller who poses
the highest degree of conflict is tr2 since both travellers share the same path. tr2
also identifies tr1 as the source of the highest conflict, and therefore, both travellers
start to communicate. At the same time, tr3 views tr4 as the biggest threat and
communicates with him/her to initiate the bargaining process.
tr1 and tr2 share the same preferred path, which means that both traveller will
have to pay extra 6 price units for sharing a path. However, if tr2 changed his/her
strategy, both travellers will have to pay 2 price units plus an extra 1 price unit for tr2
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Figure 4.3: Graph representing possible paths.
as a penalty for changing his/her preferred route. Since this is tr1’s initiative, we will
consider the 3 price units as tr2’s own utility cost. According to this arrangement,
the first coalition is established:
S1 = {tr1, tr2} (4.16)
P S1% =
{{
p
(tr1)
1 , p
(tr2)
2
}
,
{
p
(tr1)
2 , p
(tr2)
1
}}
(4.17)
For tr3 and tr4, the situation is different. Both travellers have the exact same
preferred path with conflict cost of 5 price units. If any of them swerved, the swerving
party will still have to pay the price of 6 units, and the other party will pay 5 price
units. Therefore, in accordance with the approach used for S1, while assuming that
tr3 is the initiator, the following coalition is established:
S2 = {tr3, tr4} (4.18)
P S2% =
{{
p
(tr3)
1 , p
(tr4)
2
}
,
{
p
(tr4)
2 , p
(tr3)
1
}}
(4.19)
According to this arrangement, tr3 is gaining only 1 price unit while tr4 is gaining
nothing. However, by checking the strategy set of S1, it is clear that for tr3 and tr4
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to not have a conflict with tr1 and tr2, they have to choose p
(tr3)
1 and p
(tr4)
1 . Thus,
P S2% =
{
p
(tr3)
1 , p
(tr4)
1
}
(4.20)
Furthermore, since forming the second coalition was based on the formation of S1,
the following grand coalition is established.
SGND = {tr1, tr2, tr3, tr4} (4.21)
P SGND% =
{
p
(tr1)
1 , p
(tr2)
2 , p
(tr3)
1 , p
(tr4)
1
}
(4.22)
4.5 Simulation Work
In this experimental work, we consider the scenario of N travellers contemplating
travel plans from the same source to the same destination, as shown in Figure 4.3.
These travellers have limited sets of possible actions. They have to choose, according
to their own personal preferences, a set of two actions (i.e., paths). These paths are
ordered according to the travellers’ preferences. All travellers are departing at the
same time. Furthermore, since each option has its own utility cost, and instead of
including the actual route costs in the utility cost, it is assumed that each traveller has
a sponsor. The sponsor is willing to pay the cost of any available path. Although,
there is no additional cost for the travellers if they changed their strategies, they
have to pay the plan overlapping cost. In other words, if two travellers choose the
same segment, each traveller will pay 1 price unit. The team trip planning problem
becomes a cooperative game for which an appropriate cost distribution among all
travellers is needed. The final solution assignment is defined according to the following
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formulation:
C(c) =
{
x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N
xi(N) = c(N) and
∑
i∈S
xi(S) ≤ c(S)for each S ∈ 2N \∅
}
(4.23)
This core function is used to describe the situation in which the cost value is dis-
tributed among the travellers within a game. We observe that
∑
i∈S xi(S) ≤ c(S)∀S ∈
2N \∅ to ensure game stability.
4.5.1 Simulation Environment
The simulated road network represents the highways between the city of London-
ON and Toronto-ON. Road segments are assigned with cost values reflecting each
traveller’s personal preferences and demands. These preferences in this simulation
work include travelling times, safety threats, and reported traffic speed values. Each
traveller has two preferences, and for each preference, there is a generalized cost
function. The paths are chosen based on temporal and monetary constraints.
4.5.2 Trip Planning for 10 Travellers
In this simulation scenario, 10-travellers are dispatched according to their personal
preferences such that each traveller has only two possible paths from the source to
the destination. Their chosen paths are as the following:
ptr11 = b→ c→ i→ k → p→ q (4.24)
ptr12 = a→ s→ c→ i→ k → p→ q (4.25)
ptr21 = b→ d→ f → j → p→ q (4.26)
ptr22 = a→ s→ c→ i→ k → p→ q (4.27)
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ptr31 = b→ d→ f → j → p→ q (4.28)
ptr32 = a→ s→ c→ i→ k → p→ q (4.29)
ptr41 = b→ c→ i→ l→ r (4.30)
ptr42 = a→ s→ c→ i→ k → p→ q (4.31)
ptr51 = b→ c→ i→ k → p→ q → r (4.32)
ptr52 = a→ s→ c→ i→ k → p→ q (4.33)
ptr61 =
′ b′ → d→ f → j → p→ q → r (4.34)
ptr62 =
′ a′ → s→ c→ i→ k → p→ q (4.35)
ptr71 = b→ c→ i→ l→ r (4.36)
ptr72 = b→ c→ i→ k → p→ q (4.37)
ptr81 = b→ c→ i→ k → p→ q → r (4.38)
ptr82 = a→ s→ c→ i→ k → p→ q (4.39)
ptr91 = b→ c→ i→ k → p→ q → r (4.40)
ptr92 = a→ s→ c→ i→ k → p→ q (4.41)
ptr101 = b→ c→ h→ r (4.42)
ptr102 = b→ c→ i→ k → p→ q (4.43)
If the travellers choose not to cooperate, each traveller will attempt to selfishly use
his/her preferred path. The outcome of the game, if each traveller acts selfishly, is
indicated in Table 4.2. Also depicted in Table 4.2 is the outcome when the travellers
act irrationally and chose their second preferred paths. An interesting outcome is
observed when one traveller acts differently from the other travellers, in which case
the final outcome may prove profitable for the traveller.
Through the use of the bargaining model, the team trip planning problem can be
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Figure 4.4: Utility values for members of potential coalitions.
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Table 4.2: The outcome of selfish mobility planning
Traveller P tri1 vs P
tr−i
1 P
tri
2 vs P
tr−i
1 P
tri
1 vsP
tr−i
2 P
tri
2 vs P
tr−i
2
tr1 35 47 47 59
tr2 27 20 20 59
tr3 27 20 20 59
tr4 27 20 20 59
tr5 41 47 47 59
tr6 33 20 20 59
tr7 27 19 19 46
tr8 41 47 47 59
tr9 41 47 47 59
tr10 21 10 47 46
U =
∑
i,j ω(η
tri , ptrij ) 320 NA NA 564
solved, and a fair cost allocation scheme can be found such that each traveller will pay
at most the same amount he/she would have paid if the game was non-cooperative.
The first step of bargaining is to identify the potential coalitions. According to the
utility values, as shown in Figure 4.4, seven coalitions are identified based on the con-
flict of interest as explained in Algorithm 2. Three coalitions have initially 2-travellers,
while the other coalitions are singletons. The utility value of coalition members is
important to identify a coalition as an actual coalition. If coalition members are
better off playing independently, then they can break away from their coalition. Fur-
thermore, if a traveller in a singleton coalition was negatively impacted due to the
agreement among other travellers, he/she should be able to change his/her chosen
strategy to improve upon his/her allocated cost value.
According to the chosen actions by the coalitions, as shown in Table 4.3, we have
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Table 4.3: Potential coalition and their designated strategies
Coalitions Members Strategy
S1 {tr2, tr3}
{
ptr21 , p
tr3
2
}
S2 {tr4, tr7}
{
ptr41 , p
tr7
2
}
S3 {tr5, tr8}
{
ptr52 , p
tr8
1
}
S4 {tr1}
{
ptr11 , p
tr1
2
}
S5 {tr6}
{
ptr61 , p
tr6
2
}
S6 {tr9}
{
ptr91 , p
tr9
2
}
S7 {tr10}
{
ptr101 , p
tr10
2
}
the following cost distribution for the grand coalition SGND:
{ptr11 , ptr21 , ptr32 ptr41 , ptr52 , ptr61 , ptr72 , ptr81 , ptr91 , ptr101 } = {30, 24, 27, 26, 36, 30, 25, 48, 36, 26}
(4.44)
The total cost of the grand coalition under the new strategy arrangement is
U =
∑
i,j
ω(ηtri , ptrij ) = 308 < 320, (4.45)
which indicates that the new arrangement has improved the overall cost value. How-
ever, traveller tr8 and traveller tr10 are paying more than what they would have paid
if the game was non-cooperative. With regards to traveller tr8, he/she is a part of
coalition S3 with a binding agreement. Thus, unilateral actions are not permitted
until all other singleton coalitions have determined their final strategies. Traveller
tr10, on the other hand, is free to change his/her strategy to improve his/her utility
value. When tr10 changes his/her strategy to p
tr10
2 , we will have the following strategy
allocation:
{ptr11 , ptr21 , ptr32 ptr41 , ptr52 , ptr61 , ptr72 , ptr81 , ptr91 , ptr102 } = {29, 28, 25, 24, 34, 29, 24, 47, 38, 22}
(4.46)
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U =
∑
i,j
ω(ηtri , ptrij ) = 300 < 320. (4.47)
This new arrangement has improved tr10’s cost value allocation. However, tr8’s
Table 4.4: The outcome of third round of negotiation
Traveller P tri1 vsP
tr−i
1 P
tri
2 vsP
tr−i
2 1
st Round 2nd Round 3rd Round
tr1 35 59 30 29 31
tr2 27 59 24 28 27
tr3 27 59 27 25 20
tr4 27 59 26 24 23
tr5 41 59 36 34 36
tr6 33 59 30 29 28
tr7 27 46 25 24 21
tr8 41 59 48 47 38
tr9 41 59 36 38 40
tr10 21 59 26 22 18
U =
∑
i,j ω(η
tri , ptrij ) 320 564 308 300 282
utility value has not improved, and tr2 has an added cost. Furthermore, when tr2
attempts to change strategy, the cost value increases. The next possible action is for
tr5 and tr8 to withdraw from their potential coalition. The following cost arrangement
converges:
{ptr11 , ptr21 , ptr32 ptr41 , ptr51 , ptr61 , ptr72 , ptr81 , ptr91 , ptr102 } = {31, 27, 20, 23, 36, 28, 21, 38, 40, 18}
(4.48)
and the overall cost is
U =
∑
i,j
ω(ηtri , ptrij ) = 282 < 320. (4.49)
Therefore, the travellers will be paying less than or equal to what they would have paid
if the game was non-cooperative. According to these results, the game is concluded,
and an enforceable agreement is reached. It is worth noting that this outcome is a
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result of three rounds of negotiations. Other outcomes are possible if other members
of singleton coalitions are allowed to change their strategies. Furthermore, according
to Assumption 4.3.1, travellers can choose less favoured strategies within a coalition.
Thus, if breaking a coalition did hurt other travellers, tr5 and tr8 would have had to
re-establish the initial coalition.
As demonstrated in this scenario, and as summarized in Table 4.4, some travellers
might have found themselves in a situation in which the choice to join a coalition is not
different from the choice to remain alone, if not worse. Furthermore, as the number of
travellers increases, the coalition quality as represented by the benefits provided to its
members decreases, and the chances of having an empty core increases. This happens
partially due to the lack of alternative strategies. Expanding and diversifying the set
of strategies will strengthen a traveller’s positions during the bargaining process.
4.5.3 Analysis of Team Trip Planning Games Parameters
There are many parameters involved in cooperative trip planning such as the number
of travellers (N) and potential coalitions. Next, we investigate the decision sensitivity
to these parameters.
Decision Sensitivity to Number of Travellers and Potential Coalitions:
In cooperative trip planning, the size of the team is an important factor that affects
the stability of the game. Finding the optimum number of travellers is not an easy
task. Ideally, there would be as many travellers as the number of unique strategies.
For our case, we have 6 unique paths from the source to the destination. Therefore, to
avoid the repeated use of the same path, an optimum number of travellers would be 6,
which is not practical. To investigate the issue of the solution stability, the previous
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Figure 4.5: Effect of N on the cost allocation process.
experimental scenario is re-examined for different values of N . It is important to
observe how the value of N affects the cost allocation process and the potential
coalition creation process. Table 4.5 shows that, for various values of N , there are
different average cost reduction values per traveller. As seen in Figure 4.5, as the
number of travellers increases, the cost reduction value increases until N reaches a
peak value (in this case 30); then, the cost reduction value starts to decrease. This
can be attributed to the available sets of unique strategies. For 4 unique strategies
(paths), we have 6 unique sets of strategies. It is possible that for N = 30, these
6 unique sets appear as strategy sets, and thus a better chance to avoid conflict
arises. As the value of N keeps increasing, this advantage diminishes due to the wide
adaptation of these strategies.
Furthermore, coalitions are created based on the conflict of interest and the added
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Table 4.5: Effect of N on the cost allocation process
size of N Average Cost Reduction
10 3.8
20 8.6
30 12
40 6.375
60 2.5
Table 4.6: Effect of N on the number of potential coalitions
size of N Potential Coalitions Formed Coalitions Average Cost Reduction
10 3 2 3.8
20 3 3 8.6
30 6 3 12
40 6 4 6.375
60 5 4 2.5
profit. As shown in Figure 4.6, as the number of travellers increases, the chances of
having more coalitions increase, which can lead to a better cost allocation. Table
4.6 presents the effect of N on potential and existing coalitions and its reflection on
the process of cost allocation. The number of created coalitions is different than the
number of actual existing coalitions, which had emerged according to the procedure
described in Algorithm 2. Without loss of generality, the more coalitions we are
able to create and keep, the better cost allocation process we will have. It can be
noted that for the highest cost reduction value, the number of formed coalitions is
substantially lower than its initial value. This shows that due to the method by which
a coalition is chosen and maintained, the solution gets closer to its best cost allocation
arrangement.
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Figure 4.6: Effect of N on the number of potential and established coalitions.
4.5.4 Solution Convergence Analysis
As previously discussed, it can be seen that the final outcome resulting from our
game-theoretic model is heuristic and might not be optimal. Therefore, to fully as-
sess the developed model, we need to compare the cost allocation outcomes with
the ground truth. In other words, we need to compare the heuristic strategy assign-
ment, and the subsequent cost of the grand coalition, with the optimum deterministic
overall cost. However, as the number of travellers increases, the number of possible
strategies increases. For example, for N travellers with only 2 possible strategies per
traveller, there are 2N possible solutions. For more than 20 travellers, the real-time
centralized-brute-force search for the best solution becomes computationally prohib-
ited. Therefore, validating the heuristic developed solution in comparison with the
ground truth is limited to 10− 20 travellers. In order to find the optimum strategic
assignment, we need to construct more than 1 million possible permutations for 20
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Table 4.7: Various study cases with 10 and 20 travellers
Selfish Game Outcome Bargaining Game Outcome Optimum outcome No. Rounds
For 10 Travellers
330 292 292 4
368 332 324 2
352 328 316 1
368 348 340 2
298 254 238 2
338 280 268 3
316 300 286 3
330 306 296 3
302 272 250 2
354 328 326 2
For 20 Travellers
2064 1446 1406 2
1544 1456 1456 2
1554 1468 1402 1
1338 1242 1202 2
1354 1230 1180 3
1610 1508 1470 2
1756 1704 1602 1
1628 1542 1482 2
1386 1252 1190 1
1512 1384 1298 2
travellers.
The final solution of the bargaining game is evaluated in terms of its computa-
tional complexity and its proximity to the optimum deterministic solution. For the
analysis of the computational complexity, it is important to understand how the final
decisions are reached. There are two stages needed to find the final solution. In the
first stage, travellers determine their preferred strategies through optimizing their
objective functions. In the second stage, the travellers will broadcast their strate-
gies so that each traveller can find other travellers with conflicting strategies. These
travellers will start the negotiation process in order to form coalitions. The first set
of agreed upon strategies is publicized. Then, if a traveller is not satisfied with the
final outcome, a second round of negotiation will commence. If we want to imple-
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ment a centralized solution, the first stage will remain as is. Then, all travellers will
send their preferred sets of strategies and their conflict criteria to the central control
unit. It is due to the second stage that the exhaustive search approach is becoming
infeasible as the number of possibilities grows exponentially (|S|N). Therefore, the
superiority of the heuristic developed model in terms of computational complexity is
established.
As for the heuristic solution proximity to the exact solution(s), Table 4.7 was
established for 20 experimental instances, half of which are constructed with 10 trav-
ellers and the other half is constructed with 20 travellers. We can see that regardless
of the number of travellers in the game, the solution converges in less than 4 negoti-
ation rounds. At all times the solution was a great improvement over the worst case
scenario. However, despite the major improvement and the relative closeness that our
solution achieved, only in two instances out of the 20 tested study-cases the solution
were equal to the global optimum.
Personalization of Preferences
It is integral to our design that the strategies chosen by the travellers are person-
alized. Furthermore, to have a balanced cooperative team trip planning game, it is
also important for its non-cooperative counterpart to have at least one equilibrium.
Therefore, travellers must be able to choose, establish, or modify their strategies
based on their personal preferences such that they can engage in a selfish trip plan-
ning endeavour.
The traveller-centric trip planning module is responsible for providing each trav-
eller with his/her individualized strategies. The travellers, if left without being en-
rolled in the bargaining game, should be able to engage in a non-cooperative game
that has an equilibrium. The game with re-planning should have a solution that
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converges to Nash mixed equilibrium. Chapter 5 details the implementation of the
traveller-centric trip planning module.
4.6 Summary
This Chapter discussed the existence of a solution for the cooperative trip plan-
ning game. A link was made between the cooperative trip planning game and its
non-cooperative counterpart to establish the solution’s existence and the game’s bal-
ancedness.
This chapter presented a bargaining model as a solution for the trip planning
game. This bargaining model was used for 2-traveller game and for a coalition-based
game, for which cases a solution procedure was introduced. According to this solution
procedure, any n-person cooperative game can be reduced to a 2-person game.
Experimental scenarios were presented in this Chapter to demonstrate the im-
plementation of the bargaining model. The encouraging results produced by the
bargaining model demonstrate the efficiency of the developed cooperative module.
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Chapter 5
Traveller-Centric Trip Planning
Module 1
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 and 4, it is indicated that, as a part of the rationality assumption, the
players are expected to develop their own strategies based on their own travelling
preferences and as such, their sets of strategies have to be ordered based on their
defined individualized gains. Additionally, the argument presented for the game’s
balancedness has been built based on the assumption that there is always an equilib-
rium for the non-cooperative game. The research in this chapter is concerned with
these two issues.
This chapter describes the process of designing and implementing a behavioural-
driven individualized trip planning module that enables the travellers to have their
own unique strategies. These strategies can be used later for the team trip planning
game. The developed module is designed to be a stand-alone behavioural-driven in-
vehicle guidance system, which can be used in non-cooperative games. Furthermore,
1The research work in this chapter has appeared in part in [88] and [89]
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the module, as a part of the TMP framework, is responsible for the rationality of the
cooperative planning game, as described in Chapter 3. The research in this chapter
focuses on the individualized aspect of the framework and investigates the concentra-
tion problem as a non-cooperative game to validate the module’s functionality and
efficiency.
5.2 Non-cooperative Team Trip Planning Game:
Individualized Trip Planning
In the team trip planning game, the travellers are assumed to have personal strategies
that have been chosen based on personal/selfish motives. Therefore, if the players
were to compete on a non-cooperative/competitive basis, the outcome will correspond
to an equilibrium such that Proposition 4.2.1 holds true.
In this thesis, the travellers’s strategies are defined as their chosen routing plans for
their trips. However, for the team trip planning game to achieve an acceptable stable
outcome (i.e., an equilibrium), the travellers should be capable of individualizing their
routes according to their preferences. Although the routes suggested by conventional
guidance systems can lead to a stable outcome, validating Proposition 4.2.1, the
travellers might end with an outcome that contradicts the notion of self-interest.
Therefore, in order to enable the travellers to choose the most appropriate strategies,
the team trip planning problem is viewed and treated as a non-cooperative game.
5.2.1 Non-Cooperative Team Trip Planning Game
The game Σ is a 3-tuple (S, P, U). In this game, S is the group of travellers involved
in the game; P is the set of available strategies for each traveller; and U is the set of
expected payoffs. For the game to be realistic, the following conditions are to be met
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• The players in S are driven by self-interest. Their ultimate goal is to maximize
their personal utility functions regardless of the overall state of the network.
• The set of available strategies for all travellers, P = p1 × p2 × p3 × ... × pN ,
is rich and diverse but, ultimately, a limited one. The individual sets, pns, are
asymmetric. In other words, travellers might have sets with different strategies
at their disposal.
• The utility function, U , may vary from one traveller to another according to
their best interests. For example, a traveller may consider the cost to be the
journey time while another traveller may consider the cost to be the incurred
financial cost.
The first condition is intuitive and plays into the notion that the players in any game
are assumed to be rational. The second condition might complicate the analysis.
For example, if two players, tr1 and tr2, have two sets of strategies such that P1 ∪
P2 = φ, the two players might not be considered to be playing the same game.
However, if we consider the case that there is a third player tr3 who has strategy
set P3 such that P1 ∪ P3 6= φ and P2 ∪ P3 6= φ, it is sufficient to say that tr1 and
tr2 are indirectly playing with each other in relation to tr3. The third condition
requires further discussion. System analyses become difficult when the utilities are
not of the same cost domain. If the travellers have different price assessment for
the same commodities, it is difficult to formulate an expectation about the final
state of the system (i.e., the equilibrium). For instance, travellers on highways are
sometimes presented with two choices: toll and toll-free highways. Some travellers
choose the toll-free highway according to their financial considerations while other
travellers choose the toll highway according to their journey time considerations. In
this example, the same commodity has two different utility values: monetary and
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temporal. Nonetheless, in real life, travellers do have different utilities for the same
commodities. While travellers on individual levels can reason their options based on
these utility values, it may prove difficult to perform system analysis. To deal with
this challenge, I propose the use of two independent utility functions. The first utility
function is the traveller’s utility function. The traveller may choose to keep his/her
function private or share it with others. The second utility function is the system’s
utility function for each road. The values of these functions are known to all travellers
and are used for system analysis to determine the expected best and worst social cost
values (i.e., best and worst equilibria).
The user’s utility values are of important due to their intrinsic relationship with the
personal choices of the traveller. Since the travellers would choose strategies according
to their utility-values, these utility-values affect the convergence of an equilibrium, the
stability of such an equilibrium, and the quality of the equilibrium. Therefore, there
is a need for an individualized trip planner that provides the traveller with rational
strategies and cost values associated with these strategies. Hence, the research in this
chapter can be divided into two parts:
1. The first part is concerned with the design of an individualized trip planner.
The goal is to have a personalized in-vehicle guidance system that allows the
travellers to selfishly plan their trips. Although the various game theoretic
notions will not be emphasized throughout this part, the travellers will plan
their trip according to their best understanding of the state of the environment.
In other words, their strategies will be to the best of their expectation, which
should allow for Nash equilibrium to converge. If replanning is allowed, a mixed
Nash equilibrium should converge.
2. The second part is an analytical one in which the state of the network is inves-
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tigated to validate the efficiency of the converging equilibrium. I will use the
traffic concentration problem discussed in Chapter 2 as a use-case to demon-
strate the (in)efficiency of the developed solution.
Therefore, as a part of the Team Mobility Planning (TMP) framework, I propose a
Traveller-Centric Trip Planning (TCTP) module: a novel approach for trip planning
that accommodates soft and hard routing criteria. I use the term Traveller-Centric
to describe the process through which the traveller’s personal planning preferences
influence the routing process. The routing choices will be used as strategies in the
cooperative game.
5.2.2 Traveller-Centric Trip Planning (TCTP) Module
The individualized trip planning process is executed over two stages. In the first
stage, feasible road segments are identified and assessed based on the travellers’ rout-
ing preferences. The feasible areas are determined through an Advanced Traveller
Information System (ATIS). ATIS service providers offer free/subscription-based ser-
vices to provide a trip planner with updated maps and online/oﬄine traffic informa-
tion [90, 91]. Few examples of ATISs are TomTom, Google, HERE, INRIX, CoPilot,
WorldNavigator, and Ontario HighWays Maps. The road assessment criteria are as-
sumed to be stated by the traveller as linguistic negotiable concepts. For example,
a traveller could use a linguistic concept to represent demands such as “high speed”
and “congestion free roads”. Based on these demands, the system will evaluate the
various road segments. A hierarchical fuzzy inference engine is used to compute the
cost of each road segment. The cost of the feasible routes are then mapped into
linguistic concepts: “Recommended Route”, “Marginally Recommended Route”, and
“Not Recommended Route”. The traveller’s influence on the system’s interpretation
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of what constitutes an optimum route is represented using the “Traveller’s Doctrines”.
A traveller’s doctrine is a set of beliefs that captures the traveller’s perception of what
is important and significant while planning a trip.
The second stage of the TCTP module is an optimization process through which
the traveller’s hard demands (constraints) are brought into play in determining the
optimum route. There are several possible hard demands that can be used such as the
latest accepted arrival time and the temporal and the monetary constraints [92, 93].
Next, I formulate the individualized aspect of the team trip planning game.
5.3 Problem Formulation
We consider a traveller tri, contemplating a trip from an initial location s
tri to a final
destination location f tri . The trip from stri to f tri can be made along one of a set
of feasible routes R(stri , f tri), as shown Figure 5.1. For each route r ∈ R(stri ,f tri),
a set of attributes Ar(s
tri ,f tri) is defined. Ar captures the distance δr(s
tri ,f tri), be-
tween stri and f tri along route r, Trip-Time τr(s
tri ,f tri) along route r, safety index
σr(s
tri ,f tri), comfort index φr(s
tri ,f tri), and traffic consistency index κr. Each route r
is constructed as a set of linked road segments Lr = {l1, l2, ...., ln}, where the first road
segment l1 originates at s
tri , and the last road segment ln terminates at f
tri . For each
road segment li ∈ Lr, we define Alir : a set of attributes similar to that of the route
r, vis-a-vis, δlir , the travel distance along road segment li on route r, Trip-Time τ
li
r ,
safety index σlir , comfort index φ
li
r , and traffic consistency index κ
li
r . The Trip-time
τ lir and safety index σ
li
r are considered to be situation dependent. At traveller tri’s
disposal is a set of transportation modalities TM = { tm1, tm2, ...., tmm}. For each
transportation modality tmi and route r ∈ R, we define a cost function ξtmir = f(Lr).
The cost of the trip from stri to f tri , denoted by ξr, depends on the route taken,
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str
ftr
R
Figure 5.1: Depiction of a map from initial point stri and destination point f tri .
the chosen transportation modality, and the contextual information (i.e., traffic, and
weather, among others). The notion of cost is multi-aspect, in the sense that it ex-
plicitly quantifies monetary costs, temporal costs, and safety costs to the extent that
a multi-criteria cost formulation is employed to guide the optimization process. Since
the impact and the significance of each aspect of the cost function is traveller depen-
dent, I introduce the traveller’s preferences and constraints (i.e., the doctrines). This
doctrine is denoted by Γtri(stri ,f tri)={γ1, γ2, ....., γm} , where γi signifies the weight
that traveller tri assigns to a given attribute. Traveller tri’s desirable route can be
found as the following:
rtriOpt = Min
∀rtrik ∈Rtri
Υ(stri , f tri ,Γtri), (5.1)
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where Υ represents the process by which the optimal route rtriOpt is found.
The solution to the individualized trip planning problem should be in a form of a
guidance system that provides the traveller with individualized routing suggestions.
5.4 Conceptual Architecture: Traveller-Centric Trip
Planning (TCTP) Module
The objective of the TCTP is to find optimum routes from stri to f tri . However,
the optimality of any given route is traveller-centric. The assessment of these routes
depends on the travellers’ preferences and constraints. Preferences are regarded as
the travellers’ soft demands or objective(s), while the constraints are considered to
be the travellers’ hard demands. Figure 5.2 depicts a high level architecture of the
TCTP. A variety of sensing devices are deployed to probe traffic and gather the
contextual traffic information. This information is gathered, aggregated, and used
for future predictions using various ATISs. In the proposed design, it is assumed
that a designated ATIS is available for the TCTP which can be used for further
routing purposes. The ATIS is responsible for identifying the area of interest R as
well as various contextual information pertaining to R. Snow and rain precipitation,
black ice, as well as the traffic speed and road occupancy are few examples of the
information that can be obtained from an ATIS service provider.
The doctrine based recommendation unit is a key component of the developed
TCTP module. As seen in Figure 5.2 and described in Equation 5.1, this module will
obtain the source stri the destination f tri and the doctrine Γtri from the traveller.
It will also receive the traffic attributes, Ar, and the area of interest, R, from the
ATIS. This unit will compute the cost value ξr. ξr is a single value that represents
the conclusion of the doctrine assessment unit according to the chosen doctrine, Γtri .
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Figure 5.2: Schematic diagram of the TCTP module.
Hence, different doctrines can lead to different ξr values.
The traveller interacts with the TCTP module through the traveller decision aid
unit. The traveller presents his/her travel preferences and monetary and temporal
constraints to the TCTP through this unit. This unit will inform the doctrine-based
recommendation unit about the travellers’ chosen doctrine(s). Once the ξr values are
computed, this module will determine and suggest the best route according to the
travellers’ expressed constraints.
5.5 Road Recommendation Assessment Using Hi-
erarchical Fuzzy Inference Approach
Central to the road’s recommendation assessment are the preferences of the travellers.
These preferences may span various aspects such as safety, speed, or a weighted
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combination of both. By integrating the various pieces of contextual information and
routing preferences, the TCTP module will perform a traveller-centric assessment
to produce a recommendation value for each feasible route. This process can be
computationally intractable if traditional crisp computing approaches are employed.
Therefore, tools of soft computing are chosen, whereby the inputs to the doctrine-
based recommendation unit are represented as linguistic/fuzzy concepts.
The criteria that are used in this research to identify the feasible routes are
twofolds: 1) hard constraints such as monetary and temporal constraints, and 2)
personal preferences such as road safety, reported traffic speed, and road occupancy.
Road safety is defined as a function of weather conditions and road conditions. The
presence/absence of snow and black-ice as well as the traffic’s speed and congestion
are all considered when assessing the safety of any road segment. These factors are
chosen in an exemplary context, as more factors influencing trip planning can be
employed, as discussed in [94].
5.5.1 Fuzzy Inference Engine in TCTP Module
The fuzzy inference engine in the TCTP module, as depicted in Figure 5.3, receives
various traffic information from the ATIS. The received information is then fuzzified
so they belong to predefined fuzzy logic subsets. For instance, speed is fuzzified into
slow, moderate, or fast. These subsets are represented by generalized bell-shaped
membership functions. The membership functions are chosen for all doctrines through
a process of trial-and-error. For example, if the road segment has black ice and
snow, then we would adjust the membership functions and tune the rules to have the
segment assessed as unsafe. The membership functions used in the TCTP module
for speed, safety and congestion as well as the road recommendation level are shown
in Table 5.1.
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Figure 5.3: Inner schematic of the doctrine based recommendation module.
5.5.2 Concept of Doctrine in TCTP Module
Although most travellers would desire a short journey time, they also have other
preferences. For example, traveller may express interest in preferences such as safety,
comfortability, and scenery entertainment, among others. The TCTP module ad-
dresses these preferences with the concept of doctrine. Traveller’s doctrine, Γtri , is
a set of beliefs based on which the road recommendation unit perceives the environ-
ment. The doctrine determines the way in which the roads are assessed: negatively
or positively. Doctrines allow for travellers to prioritize their preferences, which ef-
fectively leads to a change in the road recommendation cost value. Based on this
change, each doctrine might produce a different preferred path for the same routing
problem.
Three doctrines are defined in this chapter as strategic options for the travellers.
The first doctrine is the speed doctrine: the roads that have high traffic speed are
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Table 5.1: Membership function used in the TCTP system.
Fuzzy Logic Sets Membership Functions
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recommended. In the speed doctrine, the highest weight, γi, is assigned to the average
speed attribute, Saverage, in each road segment. The second doctrine is named the
safety doctrine: if the road is safe, then it is recommended. In this doctrine the highest
weight, γi, is given to the safety index, σr(s
tri , f tri). Nevertheless, safety is a vague
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concept. For simplicity, safety is defined in terms of the weather conditions that may
complicate driving and compromise the travellers’ safety. The third doctrine is named
the compound doctrines and is concerned equally with safety and speed. If speed and
safety demands are relatively satisfied, then the road segment is recommended.
5.5.2.1 The Speed Doctrine
These doctrines are implemented using the fuzzy inference engine. The speed doctrine
is represented as follows:
IF IsSpeedLow
Then NotRecommendedRoad
The speed index is given a weight that is higher than the weights assigned to the other
road attributes Alir s. This means that the road congestion and safety index are still
being considered in this doctrine. For example, in the case that speed is moderate
and there is heavy snow, the road is regarded as not recommended. The following
rule shows this relationship:
IF IsSpeedModerate & IsUnSafeRoad
& IsHeavyCongestion
Then NotRecommendedRoad
5.5.2.2 The Safety Doctrine
In the safety doctrine, the safety index, σr(s
tri , f tri), is given the highest weight among
the other attributes. The following rule shows this restriction:
IF IsUnSafe
Then NotRecommendedRoad
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In addition, speed and congestion attributes are not ignored in the safety doctrine.
For example, the following rule shows that for a road with a moderate safety index,
it is assessed as not recommended if speed is low and the congestion is high:
IF IsSpeedLow & IsSafeWithCaution
& IsHeavyCongestion
Then NotRecommendedRoad
On the other hand, under the same safety index, but with better speed/congestion
conditions, the road is considered to be recommended:
IF IsSpeedModerate & IsSafeWithCaution
& IsNoCongestion
Then RecommendTheRoad
5.5.2.3 The Compound Doctrine
For the compound doctrine, the following rules examine the safety index, σr(s
tri , f tri),
and the speed index, Saverage, to formulate a road segment assessment:
IF IsSafeRoad & IsSpeedSufficient
& IsNoCongestion
Then RecommendTheRoad
IF IsSpeedLow
Then NotRecommendedRoad
IF IsUnSafe
Then NotRecommendedRoad
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It can be seen that, in this doctrine, equal weights are assigned to the speed and
safety attributes, while lower weights are assigned to the other attributes.
The route recommendation assessment in all three doctrines requires a comprehen-
sive understanding of the road safety and the traffic congestion assessment process.
For the assessment process to be effective for all doctrines, a hierarchical approach is
devised. The safety index is inferred based on two road attributes: black ice and the
amount of accumulated snow. The following inference rules show an example of the
safety index assessment for inspected road segments:
IF IsNoBlackIce & IsNoSnow
Then IsSafeRoad
IF IsLightSnow & IsNoBlackIce
Then IsSafeWithCaution
IF &IsHeavySnow&IsBlackIce
Then IsUnsafe
Traffic congestion is another index that is inferred from known attributes: the road
segment’s width and occupancy. The following rules show the process of estimating
traffic congestions for road segments:
IF IsMediumWideness & IsLowOccupancy
Then IsNoCongestion
IF IsWideWideness & IsModerateOccupancy
Then IsModeratCongestion
IF IsExtrHighOccupancy
Then IsStpGoCongestion
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Road Recommendation Level 
Road Safety Traffic Speed Congesiton
Black IceSnow Road Occupancy Road Wideness
Figure 5.4: The hierarchical order in the situation assessment system.
As shown in Figure 5.4, safety and congestion as basic assessment criteria are
assessed based on the data provided by the ATIS. Since more sensory/historical data
can be added at the basic level, the process of producing the basic assessment values
can be expanded without increasing the complexity of the assessment process. The
two levels of assessment are detailed in Table 5.2, highlighting the different ranges of
the input values. The output value of the road recommendation level is the cost value,
ξr, of the assessed road segment. The hierarchical design allows for the integration of
more doctrines into the TCTP module.
While it is the responsibility of the doctrine-based recommendation unit to assess
each road segment, the optimum route is determined by the decision aid unit. In the
next section, the decision making procedure is discussed.
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Table 5.2: The TCTP Module’s Fuzzification Scheme.
Contextual Information Range Membership Function Hierarchical level
0 - 37% 1- Open
Road Occupancy 20 - 70% 2- Moderate First level
60 - 92% 3- High load
80 - 100% 4- Extremely high
0 - 4 m 1- Narrow
Road width 2.5 - 6.8 m 2- Medium First level
5 - 12 m 3- Wide
0 - 0.4 1- No snow
Snow degree 0.25 - 0.8 2- Light snow First level
0.6 - 1 3- Heavy snow
0 1- No black ice
Black ice 1 2- Black ice First level
0 - 39% 1- Wide Open Road
Congestion 15 - 80% 2- Moderate Congestion Second level
60 - 95% 3- Heavy Congestion
95 - 100% 4- Stop and Go
0 - 0.55 1- Safe
Safety 0.17 - 0.87 2- Safe with caution Second level
0.6 - 1 3- Unsafe
0 - 35 1- slow
Average speed 15 - 80 Km/hr 2-Medium Second level
50 - 120 3- Fast
0 - 0.31 1- Recommended
Road recommendation 0.15 - 0.75 2- Marginally Recommended Output level
0.58 - 1 3- Not Recommended
5.6 Decision-Making Procedure for Route Selec-
tion Problem
The final decision about the optimum route is approached as an optimization problem.
The optimum path is the one that takes the traveller from his/her initial location
to the target destination, subject to the traveller’s constraints. To determine the
optimum route, two factors are considered. The first is the monetary allowance for
the trip, which would include the cash to be spent on gas, toll roads, and parking,
among others. The other factor is the traveller’s desired journey time. The TCTP
module takes advantage of these factors to explore routing options that are optimum
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in a broad sense as they go beyond the shortest distance and the shortest time in
defining optimality. Due to the doctrine’s influence, the optimum route might not
prove to be the one with the shortest trip time or the shortest distance.
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(b) A schematic graph corresponding to the road network of interest.
Figure 5.5: Mapping a satellite map to graph based on the area of interest.
The decision aid unit in the TCTP module has two types of input: 1) The trav-
eller’s constraints (i.e., trip-time and trip-monetary constraints) and 2) the cost of
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each road segment, ξi. The decision is to find the optimum route, rOpt, that minimizes
the cost, ξr, subject to the traveller’s temporal, τr, and monetary, ψ, constraints. The
trip is formulated as a graph-based combinatorial problem. Road segments, Lr, are
previously specified by the ATIS. Each li ∈ Lr has a cost value, ξi, that is computed
by the doctrine-based recommendation unit.
The problem of finding the best route can now be stated as follows: given a graph
G = (V,E), where V is the set of nodes (vertices) in the graph, and E denotes the
edges in the graph, find the route with minimum cost. The graph represents an area of
interest, R(stri , f tri), that includes the starting point, stri , and the destination point,
f tri , of the trip. The ATIS defines the area of interest prior to the trip planning to
limit the search space, as shown Figure 5.5. The goal is to find the best route, rOpt,
with minimum cost value, ξr. Travellers are using vehicles for their commute from one
point to another. The trip-planning problem with preferences windows is formulated
as follows:
rOpt = min
∑
∀i,j∈E
ξrij xij (5.2)
Subject to:
∑
j
xij −
∑
j
xji =

1 if i is a starting node
−1 if i is a destination node
0 otherwise
,∀i (5.3)
∑
i,j∈A
tij xij 6 τ k (5.4)
∑
i,j∈A
mij xij 6 ψk (5.5)
xij ∈ {0, 1} (5.6)
where
ξr = Recommendation value,
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E = Set of nodes in the net,
τ = Temporal constraint,
ψ = Monetary constraint window,
tij = Travel time over the segment ij ,
mij = Cost of travel over the segment ij ,
k = Trip query index,
xij is the decision variable representing the road segments and is defined as
xij =
{
1 if the road segment is selected
0 otherwise
(5.7)
The Constraint in Equation 5.3 stipulates that the driver leaves the starting point
and eventually arrives at the end point and never uses the same road segment twice.
The inequality in Equation 5.4 states that the trip time is never more than τ , as
indicated at the query time k. The inequality in Equation 5.5 ensures that the total
cost of the road segment does not exceed ψ at query time k. The last constraint
in Equation 5.6 is the integrity constraint. Finally, this problem can be solved as a
binary integer problem.
The objective function in Equation 5.2 is a cost function that is computed based
on the chosen doctrine. Each doctrine can be viewed as an independent soft objec-
tive. In terms of hard objectives, the formulation will have to accommodate more
constraints corresponding to the desired hard demands. If the optimization function
was infeasible, the optimization problem becomes an unconstrained routing problem
that can be solved using Dijkstra’s algorithm. Next, two measures of assessment that
can be used to compare the module’s trip suggestions with the preferences of the
travellers are defined.
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Doctrine Satisfaction Index
The TCTP module provides travellers with individualized routes reflecting their pref-
erences. For the travellers to be able to understand the quality of the suggested route,
the TCTP module associate each route with a doctrine satisfaction index. Further-
more, the doctrine satisfaction index can be used within the TMP framework to order
the different routes according to their corresponding doctrine satisfaction index.
For traveler tri, the minimum trip cost value, ξr, for the optimal route, rOpt, is
used to compute the doctrine satisfaction index, DSi . For each road segment li, li ∈
Lr, there is ξi, where ξr =
∑
∀li∈Lr ξi. Furthermore, ∀ li ∈ Lr, there is a known trip
distance |li|. DSi is defined as follows:
|Lr| =
∑
∀li∈Lr
|li| (5.8)
DSi =
∑
∀li∈Lr
ξi ∗ |li|
|Lr| . (5.9)
Correspondingly, road doctrine satisfaction index DSr can be categorized into four
levels:
DSr ∈ {Highly satisfied, Satisfied,Marginally satisfied,Unsatisfied} . (5.10)
An example of the computation of the route doctrine satisfaction index DSr is shown
in Figure 5.6. The satisfaction levels are mapped to the three membership functions
of the road recommendation unit. For instance, if DSi is computed to be 0.2, then
the DSr is fuzzified as Highly satisfied.
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UnsatisfiedHighly Satisfied Satisfied 
Figure 5.6: Doctrine satisfaction index computation process.
Safety-Risk Exposure Index
Additionally, for the safety doctrine, a trip safety-risk exposure index is provided.
Travellers who choose to use this doctrine will be provided with figures and numbers
reflecting their safety-risk exposure during the trip. The safety-risk index is computed
cumulatively throughout the trip. It is possible that after a repetitive exposure to a
low-risk activity, the overall safety risk can be assessed as a medium cumulative risk.
5.7 Individualized Trip Planning Effects on The
Concentration Problem
The traffic concentration problem is an unavoidable side-effect of the wide-use of
smart routing systems. The problem, as discussed in length in Chapter 2, occurs
when multiple-travellers share the same advice regarding their routing plans. This
problem is one of the flow control problems affected by two factors: 1) the traffic
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information; the available information represents the reality and thus can’t be altered.
2) The method through which the trip planning system handles the information affects
the decision making process, which may subsequently exasperate the problem. In
addition, the current ATISs are planning their trips in a non-traveller-centric manner.
They aim to find the route with the minimum cost without considering the overall
impact of this decision on the other travellers or on the system. Therefore, the overall
system performance may degrade [45]. The concentration problem is a result of this
form of planning.
On the other hand, even though the TCTP module is a selfish trip planner that
aims to minimize the trip cost for the traveller, the TCTP module deals with the
provided information differently through the use of doctrines. The rationale is that,
if travellers are allowed to affect the trip planning directly through expressing their
preferences, their plans will have a better chance of diversifying the routing choices.
In other words, each traveller who employs the TCTP module will have an ATIS that
is tuned to his/her preferences.
5.8 Simulation Work
The TCTP module, as explained in Section 5.4, depends on various sources of infor-
mation. For our scenarios, the following assumptions are made:
1. The ATIS is available and can provide the travellers with areas of interest,
online traffic attributes Ar, and predictions regarding the traffic information.
2. Communications between the travellers and the ATIS are established and main-
tained at all times.
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For the ATIS, Ontario’s 511 interactive map, managed by the ministry of transporta-
tion in Ontario and shown in Figure 5.7, is used to provide us with traffic and road
conditions. In addition to various weather and traffic Application Program Interfaces
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Figure 5.7: Ontario’s 511 Interaction TIS map.
(APIs), Google Maps is used to obtain real-time information. The APIs provide us
with areas of interest containing various routes connecting the starting point and the
end point. Google Maps is known for its popularity as an ATIS, in form of web/mobile
API, and therefore it has been chosen in this work for the purpose of comparison [95].
To demonstrate the efficiency of the TCTP module, an experimental work of three
parts is carried out. In the first part, the functionality of the doctrine-based unit is
discussed. We demonstrate the use of all three doctrines in the recommendation
assessment for all road segments within an area of interest R. In the second part,
the TCTP module’s performance is validated by comparing it with Google Maps’
performance. Furthermore, the doctrines’ performance is examined under various
scenarios. In the third part, the TCTP module’s impact on the system’s overall effi-
ciency is investigated. For this purpose, through the investigation of various scenarios,
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in which the travellers are using either the TCTP’s doctrines or Google Maps, the
concentration problem is discussed.
Table 5.3: The implementation of the FIS for all road segments.
xij Road Width Snow Black Ice Occupancy Saverage Safety Road Recommendation Road Recommendation Road Recommendation
(km/hr) Assessment (Speed Doctrine) (Safety Doctrine) (Compound Doctrine)
a 6 low No med to high 20 0.17 0.73 0.47 0.73
x 9 low No med to low 86 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.145
b 6 low No low 70 0.17 0.224 0.13 0.224
c 9 low No med to high 47 0.17 0.45 0.4 0.45
z 9 high No med to low 100 0.86 0.43 0.9 0.819
e 3 medium Yes low 71 0.87 0.48 0.90 0.817
f 9 low No med to low 80 0.17 0.16 0.105 0.158
g 3 medium No med to low 91 0.55 0.15 0.465 0.181
h 9 low No high 35 0.17 0.82 0.7 0.787
i 9 low No low 95 0.17 0.138 0.07 0.135
j 9 low No med to low 100 0.17 0.135 0.07 0.133
k 9 low No low 80.1 0.17 0.158 0.07 0.158
l 9 low No med to low 82 0.17 0.165 0.12 0.175
m 9 low No med to high 30 0.17 0.658 0.313 0.465
n 12 low No high 30 0.17 0.665 0.47 0.465
o 12 low No high 15 0.17 0.82 0.47 0.791
p 9 low No low 110 0.17 0.13 0.07 0.13
q 9 low No high 20 0.17 0.829 0.471 0.738
r 9 low No high 40 0.17 0.6 0.465 0.47
5.8.1 Part I: Evaluation of The Doctrine Based Recommen-
dation Unit
An important part of the developed system is the Doctrine Based Recommendation
unit. As described so far, the unit utilizes a fuzzy inference system to produce road
recommendation values in the form of road segments’ costs. In this subsection, the
functionality of the doctrine based recommendation unit is discussed.
As shown in Table 5.3, for the same values of road’s safety index, average speed,
and congestion levels, the output varies from recommended to not recommended
according to the chosen doctrine. For example, according to the safety doctrine, road
segment “a” is recommended to a certain degree. The same road segment has a much
higher cost value according to the other two doctrines. This demonstrates that for
the safety doctrine, the safety assessment of the road has contributed the most to
the final road recommendation value. Conversely, road segment “e” has a high cost
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according to the safety doctrine as opposed to the speed doctrine. In both cases, the
compound doctrine was influenced by either the low reported speed value for “a” of
the low safety assessment for “e”. Furthermore, the safety and the speed doctrine
consider all attributes contributing to the routing process. For instance, according to
the speed doctrine, road segment “x” had an edge cost lower than segment “z” even
though the average speed in segment “z” was higher. This is due to the fact that
is the safety index is higher in “z” than in “x”. Moreover, even though the safety
index was almost the same for all road segments, these road segments had different
cost values according to the safety doctrine due to the various values of speed and
congestion indices.
5.8.2 Part II: Experimental Implementation and Results
The developed TCTP module is simulated using all three doctrines. The final sugges-
tions are compared with Google Maps’ suggestions for the same trips. Examples of
the attributes of the simulated roads, as shown in Figure 5.5(b), are detailed in Table
5.4. Various attributes, Ars, are used to simulate a dynamic environment. In the fol-
lowing subsections, the doctrines’ effect on the trip planning as well as the doctrine
satisfaction index DSr are investigated for a variety of preferences and constraints.
5.8.2.1 Doctrine Effect on Trip Planning and Doctrine Satisfaction Index
To test the optimality of the routes suggested by the TCTP module with respect to
the travellers’ doctrines, three travellers equipped with the TCTP module’s available
doctrines are simulated. The final routing suggestions as well as Google Maps’ sugges-
tions are depicted in Figure 5.8. The doctrine satisfaction indices are shown in Table
5.5. It can be seen that the TCTP module provides the travellers with the routes that
are influenced by their doctrine as much as possible. The doctrine-based optimum
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Trip Time = 185 Minutes
Max. Speed= 83km/hr
Min. Speed= 40km/hr
Trip Safety Index=0.4
Trip Distance= 192km
Dsr = Satisfied
Trip Time = 145 Minutes
ax. Spe d= 87km/hr 
Min. Speed= 65.7km/hr
Avg. Speed= 75km/hr
Trip Safety Index=0.07 
Trip Distance= 192km
Toronto
(a) Traveller using TCTP module in the speed doctrine.
(b) Traveller using TCTP module in the compound doctrine.
Dsr = Satisfied
Trip Time = 190 Minutes
Max. Speed= 88km/hr 
Min. Speed= 25.7km/hr
Avg. Speed= 65km/hr
Trip Safety Index=0.03 
Trip Distance= 203km
Toronto
(c) Traveller using TCTP module in the safety doctrine.
(d) Traveller using Google Maps.
Figure 5.8: Comparison between TCTP module’s doctrines and Google Maps.
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Table 5.4: Examples of real-time traffic attributes Ar.
xij Slimit Price Snow Black Ice Occupancy Saverage
(km/hr) (km/hr)
a 60 0 low No med to high slow
x 100 0 low No med to low fast
b 80 0 low No low fast
c 100 0 low No med to high medium
z 100 0 high No med to low fast
m 100 0 low No med to high slow
p 100 12 low No low fast
q 100 0 low No high slow
r 100 0 low No high slow
routes are the ones that reflect the traveller’s preferences and constraints. Therefore,
in this particular scenario, it can be seen that all travellers were able to achieve an
acceptable level of satisfaction. Furthermore, the safety index for all travellers can
be mapped to the fuzzy set Safe as shown in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. However, this
value is normalized throughout the trip. Hence, using the speed doctrine and the
compound doctrine, it is possible that the suggested routes have segments with high
safety-risk index as oppose to the suggestions according to the safety doctrine.
Table 5.5: Routing feedback using the TCTP module and Google Maps.
Trip planner Doctrine/mode DSr
The TCTP module Speed Satisfied
The TCTP module Compound Satisfied
The TCTP module Safety Satisfied
Google Maps Fastest route NA
Even though the TCTP module is not developed to compete with the existing
navigation solutions but rather to complement their shortcomings, it is found that
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Google Maps’ initial suggestion to be noteworthy. Google Maps suggested two routes
with 3 minutes’ difference between their estimated trip times. The second path is
actually the same path suggested according to the speed doctrine. However, the
TCTP module estimated the trip time to take 20 minutes more than Google Maps’
estimation. Interestingly, the trip time provided by Google Maps can be achieved if
the travellers were able to maintain the maximum speed throughout the trip whether
driving through downtown areas or on the highways. This assumption might not be
accurate; especially, with the presence of an accident on the highway as well as the
construction in and around the destination area, as shown in Figure 5.8(d). In the
following scenarios, the different suggestions of each doctrine under various monetary
and temporal constraints are investigated.
5.8.2.2 Comparing TCTP Module’s Different Doctrines with Open and
Limited Resources
In this section, we investigate the TCTP module’s performance when presented with
different monetary and temporal constraints. Three travellers are dispatched into the
Table 5.6: Doctrine satisfaction levels for the TCTP module’s doctrines.
Trip planner Doctrine/mode Safety Index DSr
The TCTP module Speed 0.4 Marginally Satisfied
The TCTP module Compound 0.315 Satisfied
The TCTP module Safety 0.17 Satisfied
simulation environment. All travellers have unlimited resources with respect to the
trip monetary allowance and desired journey time. Each traveller is assigned a unique
TCTP doctrine. All three travellers have to start from the same source, stri , and the
same destination, f tri . To clearly indicate the difference between the three doctrines,
speed and safety obstacles are presented in various roads in the form of heavy snow
as well as accidental delays. In this scenario, the criterion based on which a plan can
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Figure 5.9: Path-planning for preference-based trip.
be viewed as successful is the doctrine satisfaction index.
As can be seen in Figure 5.9 and Table 5.6, due to the variety of obstacles made
against the travellers, the trip times were noticeably longer than usual. Furthermore,
travellers using the compound and safety doctrines were satisfied with the outcome
since safety concerns were addressed. However, since speed is the main requirement
for the traveller with the speed doctrine, the result came with doctrine satisfaction
assessment of marginally satisfied. In general, the doctrine based navigation system
was able to process the information differently for each traveller. Hence, it was able
to produced unique suggestions matching the travellers’ preferences to a great degree.
In the second use-case, we compare the suggestions provide to three travellers,
all of which are using the speed doctrine. However, each traveller has his/her own
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set of monetary constraints. Our aim is to demonstrate the response of our system
according to the hard demands of each traveller.
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Figure 5.10: Route decision for travellers using TCTP system in speed doctrine with
different monetary constraints.
In the simulated environment, certain road segments were, as indicated in Table
5.4, assigned toll cost values: when a traveller crosses these road segment, he/she
pays a price for the use of that segment. Other road segments were toll-free, and no
monetary cost is incurred as the vehicle traverses them.
As shown in in Figure 5.10, when the monetary allowance is relatively high, the
TCTP module has a higher chance of choosing the best possible route. However,
when the monetary allowance decreases, the system is forced to choose a route that
is relatively slow. Since two travellers have monetary constraints of less than 12
price units, the travellers will have to avoid the toll segment ”p” and use the toll-
free segments ”n” → ”o”. The journey time difference between the traveller with an
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allowance of 25 cash units and the traveller with an allowance of 2 cash units is about
115 minutes.
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Figure 5.11: Comparison of route decisions for the TCTP module in safety doctrine
for different temporal constraints.
5.8.2.3 Comparing The Safety Doctrine for Different Time Windows
The third use-case involves three travellers who are using the safety doctrine under
limited constraints. The main constraint that can influence the decision of the TCTP
module under the safety doctrine is the desired journey time. As shown in Figure
5.11, the travellers who are using the TCTP module with the safety doctrine were
able to meet the journey time constraints. However, as shown in Figure 5.12, the
level of safety-risk exposure changes according to the different temporal constraints.
It can be seen that when an open journey time is permitted, the safety-risk exposure
factor remains stable at a low level for the entire trip. This result shows that using
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Figure 5.12: The effect of changing the time window on the safety-risk exposure.
the safety doctrine, the TCTP module functions properly by keeping the safety-risk
exposure to low levels.
As shown in Figure 5.12, the first traveller with a journey time limit of 400 minutes
has sustained a constant low level of safety risk exposure at all times during the trip.
However, the other two travellers, who were not given an open time, had different
plans for their trips. The traveller with a journey time limit of 250 minutes was
exposed to constant medium safety-risk exposure for about 40 minutes. On the other
hand, the traveller with a journey time limit of 200 minutes was exposed to high
safety-risk exposure for 80 minutes and then low risk for another 10 minutes. The
trip times for the three travellers are shown in Figure 5.11.
A comparison between the plans of the speed doctrine and the safety doctrine
with a time window of 250 minutes reveals that the plans according to the safety
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Figure 5.13: Comparison of risk exposure in the safety mode and speed mode.
doctrine have less safety-risk exposure than those of the speed doctrine, as shown
in Figure 5.13. In conclusion, as can be seen in Figures 5.10 through 5.13, it can
be noted that the decision regarding the best route varies according to the chosen
doctrines and imposed constraints.
5.8.3 Part III: Individualized Trip Planning’s Effects on Traf-
fic Flow
In this part, we examine the effect of the TCTP module on the traffic flow of a
large number of vehicles. In the previous simulation parts, we have established that
the TCTP module is at least as good as any other routing system that uses online
information. This means that the TCTP module can be also prone to the traffic
concentration problem. The traffic concentration problem occurs when a large number
of vehicles attempt to travel within the same area at the same time window and receive
the same routing suggestions.
To investigate this issue, we have simulated 200 vehicles, equipped with the TCTP
module, to plan trips from London, ON to Toronto, ON. For comparison purposes,
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another 200 vehicles are simulated to use Google Maps as their in-vehicle guidance
solution. All vehicles equipped with the TCTP module are equally likely to have any
Table 5.7: System performance using Google Maps vs The TCTP module.
Road Segment Google Maps TCTP module’s Doctrines
a 0 152
b 200 152
x 0 48
z 0 62
c 200 138
r 200 131
e 0 3
g 0 6
f 0 59
q 200 131
p 0 69
of the three offered doctrines such that each traveller randomly and uniformly chooses
one of the three doctrines. As we can see in Table 5.7, when Google Maps is used,
during a window of 30 minutes, it consistently offers a single preferred path: “b”
→ “c” → “h” → “r” (the arc leading to the destination node is “r”). The problem
that can be observed is that regardless of the difference in the trip starting times,
all vehicles were sent along the road segment “b”. Furthermore, all of the vehicles
were sent across “c”, “r” and “q”. This is a clear example of the traffic concentration
problem. The guidance system consistently provides the same advice for all travellers
within the same area until the system’s traffic conditions are degraded. Additionally,
there is no self-correction mechanism in deployment thus far to prevent the traffic
conditions from worsening. In comparison, when giving more weight to factors such
as safety, we see that nearly 25% of the traffic was directed through “a” → “x”. As
shown in Table 5.7, it can be observed that some travellers chose the shorter route,
“b” → “c” → “h” → “r”, while other travellers chose the route “f” → “j”→ “p”
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→ “q”. Next, we discuss and compare the impact of the TCTP module and Google
Maps on the system’s efficiency.
5.8.3.1 System Efficiency Analysis
To analyze the efficiency of the TCTP module and Google Maps, the Price of Anarchy
(PoA) us used. The PoA is the ratio between the optimum system performance and
the worst system performance [86]:
PoA =
Worst Equilibrium
Optimum Outcome
(5.11)
The PoA ratio is referred to as the coordination ratio, which describes the system
degradation caused by the travellers’ selfish behaviour as well as the effect of the
provided information on the decision making process [87]. Therefore, its use as
a tool of analysis is deemed appropriate for our application. The analysis is per-
formed on the sub-graph Gˆ. This graph covers the following nodes in Figure 5.5:
Vˆ = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11} and Eˆ = {z, f, j, p, c, h, r, q}. For Gˆ, we have limited the
investigated paths to two routes as shown in Figure 5.14. The 200 vehicles are dis-
tributed over these two routes from stri to f tri . To simplify the analysis, the transition
from one route to another is neglected.
The quadratic function of cli = ali · (x2 + x) has been chosen to represent the
congestion cost function. There are several suggestions in the literature with regard
to the possible cost functions, ranging from linear functions to M/G/1-based repre-
sentations [85]. In general, the cost functions for all paths in one network can be of
the same class or of different classes. Furthermore, the simulated network used to
identify the PoA can be a simple one or an elaborately complex one. Nevertheless,
with the proper reduction and approximation, the worst PoA can always be found.
For better insight into these topics, the subject can be reviewed in [85–87], in which
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it is covered in great lengths. For simplicity, we have chosen the quadratic function
to emphasize the traffic concentration problem and its impact on the system per-
formance. This function represents a cost value that can be interpreted in terms of
various factors such as congestion, CO2 emissions in a given area, and prevalence to
accidents, among others.
As shown in Figure 5.14, the two routes have different coefficient values for their
quadratic functions. These values represent the length ratio between the two routes.
s D
 
142 km 
126 km 
Route A
Route B
Figure 5.14: Alternative routes with quadratic latency function.
Since both routes have similar attributes except for their total distance, the decision
regarding the best route from a selfish perspective is simple: the shortest path. In-
cidentally, this selfish solution is the same one that was suggested by Google Maps.
Route A will be chosen most of the times over route B unless there is a noticeable
change in journey time for route A. According to this system, all travellers will have
the same advice regarding the route with the least cost, which might lead to the traffic
concentration problem. On the other hand, to achieve an ideal traffic distribution,
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Table 5.8: System performance analysis.
Chosen Route Optimum Performance Worst Performance Google Maps The TCTP Module
Route A 105 0 200 131
Route B 95 200 0 69
Overall cost 21,435 45,426 40,200 22,750
PoA 1 2.1 1.87 1.06
the traffic should be split among the alternative routes to minimize the overall cost.
However, this will require a central control system, which is virtually impossible to
implement. Even if it was possible to have a central control system, it will result in
some of the travellers being offered routes against their preferences.
Due to the simplicity of this scenario, we are able to find the cost values of the
optimum case scenario and worst case scenario of the traffic distribution. These
values are used to set upper and lower limits for Google Maps and the developed
TCTP module. As can be seen in Table 5.8, the optimum case scenario would be
splitting the traffic in nearly two halves between the two routes. Nevertheless, from
the travellers’ perspective, some of these plans are not desired since they offer the
longer route. The worst case scenario would be when all travellers use Route B,
which will result in a maximum overall cost. For Google Maps, it is observed that
for a period of more than 30 minutes the advice for all travellers was to use Route A,
seen as the optimum route from an individual’s point of view. On the other hand, the
travellers were split among the two routes when they use the TCTP module. Even
though most travellers chose route A, a significant number of them chose route B as
their preferred path according to their preferences. This shows the effect that the
doctrines might have on the traffic distribution and the overall system performance.
Due to this diversity in the routing suggestions, the TCTP shows a superior PoA
performance as compared to Google Maps.
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Figure 5.15: Routes with quadratic latency function for downtown areas.
5.8.3.2 The Concentration Problem in Downtown Areas
The concentration problem is often associated with traffic oscillation in downtown
areas. In the following scenario, we demonstrate using 4000 vehicles in real-time
simulation the differences in suggestions provided by the TCTP module and those
provided by Google Maps, Microsoft’s Bing Maps, and Nokia’s HERE Maps. The
routes and the suggested system cost function are shown in Figure 5.15.
Table 5.9: System performance analysis for downtown area.
Chosen
Routes
Optimum
Performance
Google
Maps
Bing
Maps
HERE
Maps
The
TCTP module
Route1 1333 1000 4000 4000 845
Route2 1334 3000 0 0 2180
Route3 1333 0 0 0 975
POA 1 2.04 2.91 2.91 1.28
As shown in Table 5.9, the ultimate strategy would be to split the traffic evenly
among all three routes. However, for travellers that are relying on Bing’s Maps or
HERE’s Maps, all traffic is directed along one path regardless of the changes that
occur to the network. These changes prompted Google Maps to adjust its plans to
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suggest faster alternative routes. That is, the traffic is sent along one route until
a congestion occurs; then, the traffic is sent to an alternative route until it is also
congested. The TCTP module, on the other hand, is less affected by the oscillation
problem since speed is a priority for only a portion of the population. Therefore,
there is more stability in the network. Furthermore, as shown in Table 5.9, the
TCTP-based PoA emerged is superior to the other trip planning solutions. Hence,
the results establish the efficiency and the superiority of the converging equilibrium.
5.9 Role of TCTP Module in The TMP Frame-
work
The TCTP Module is discussed thus far as an independent in-vehicle guidance sys-
tem. For each routing query, the module produces one optimum path per doctrine.
Each path has a doctrine satisfaction index associated with it. The travellers have the
option of choosing multiple doctrines and arranging the suggested routes according
to their DSr values. The route with the highest index is the preferred route. There-
fore, the travellers are to able order their doctrines according to their preferences to
preserve Nash’s axiom of rationality. In other words, for each doctrine, Γtrij , we have
rtriOpt(Γ
tri
j ) = pi. According to the number of available doctrines and their order of pri-
orities, we have P tri =
{
ptri1 , p
tri
2 , .., p
tri
n } where ptri1 = rtriOpt(Γtrij ) such that j = 1, ..., n,
where n is the number of doctrines.
As shown through the experimental scenarios, the equilibrium resulted from the
TCTP is efficient in improving the overall social cost of the system. Therefore, the
TCTP module and the TMP Framework by extension are poised to deal with the non-
cooperative team trip planning game. Furthermore, the strategies created according
to the various doctrines can be used in the bargaining game in the cooperative trip
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planning module. In the next chapter, the TCTP is used to provide the travellers
with an ordered set of strategies that can be utilized in the cooperative game.
5.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, a traveller-centric trip planning (TCTP) module was introduced. A
full description of the module was presented with emphasis on the doctrine based
recommendation unit and the decision-aid unit. To implement the various doctrines,
a hierarchical fuzzy system was developed. An optimization based approach was used
to find the optimum route. Through the use of the TCTP module, travellers were
allowed to be proactive in choosing their routes. The rationale behind this design is to
diversify the trip planning process by invoking personal preferences into the routing
process at the early stages. Therefore, the concept of doctrines was highlighted as an
improvement to the existing trip planning techniques.
The traffic concentration problem was used as a prime example to demonstrate
the effectiveness of using a personalized trip planner to diversify and improve the net-
work’s performance. Hence, the quality of the emerged equilibrium was established.
118
Chapter 6
Treatment of The Territory
Sharing Problem 1
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I develop a multi-travellers resource sharing game: the Territory
Sharing Game. This game is formulated such that the travellers can achieve through
cooperation a regret-free outcome that guarantees the welfare of the system. The
proposed cooperative model is extended to allow for the deployment of no-regret dy-
namics and as such, the final outcome will converge to a coarse correlated equilibrium.
Additionally, the previously introduced notions of solution existence and stability are
revisited. Several simulated scenarios are introduced to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the Team Mobility Planning framework.
6.2 Social Taxi Networks
Triggered by the ubiquitous use of information technology, a new economical business
model has emerged: the sharing economy. The sharing economy is a platform in which
1The research work in this chapter has appeared in part in [96] and [97]
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people cooperate using technology to share what can be otherwise an un-utilized
inventory on fee/non-fee basis [98]. One application of interest is the social taxi
networks [99–102], known as the ride-sourcing platform and free-floating car sharing
systems. I coin the term social taxi networks to describe ride-sourcing applications
where the service is delivered to riders by utilizing a network of private vehicles. Taxi
drivers in these networks communicate with their customers through smartphone
applications (Apps). Lyft and Uber are prime examples of such social networks [103].
In this particular sense, the social taxi is similar to a traditional taxi since the provider
of the service does not share the destination with the service user, as opposed to ride-
sharing applications [104].
The treatment of the territory sharing problem can be observed in literature when
examining some of the relocation algorithms for traditional taxis [105] as well as the
ride-sharing applications [106]. The main goal of these algorithms is to (re)distribute
service providers, such as taxis, in a manner that guarantees that the maximum
number of customers is served.
With regards to traditional taxis, the operator has complete control over a fleet
of vehicles. Thus, the relocation of vehicles is subject to cost/benefit criteria. This
model is similar to the models proposed for some of the social ride-sharing platforms.
For example, in [107], Weikl and Bogenberger investigated the possible relocation
strategies of the so-called free-floating car sharing systems. They describe two possible
strategies: user-based and operator-based. According to the user-based strategy, the
users are incentivized by lower costs to use the system despite its long waiting times
and intermittent service availability. Nevertheless, not all customers can be influenced
by such incentives. According to the operator-based strategy, the number of service-
providers is increased to cover all areas. This case assumes that there is complete
control over the service providers. The problem with using these two models in
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social taxi networks is that they do not accommodate the autonomy of the service-
providers. For instance, a vehicle owner may prefer to operate in a low density
residential area due to its close proximity to their living/work place. On the other
hand, most traditional taxi companies might regard that area as a low priority area
due to its low population density. If social networks had the same relocation model,
the low density areas will be out of coverage.
In the current social taxi networks, service-providers and service-users are inde-
pendent from the operator. Thus, similar to the user-based strategy, the only manner
in which the operator can influence the process is by controlling the fare-prices ac-
cording to the state of supply and demand. This scheme is problematic since it creates
situations in which either the service-users have to pay an expensive fare due to the
lack of services, or the service-provider receives lower fare-prices due to high supply
of services.
The main concern with the traditional relocation systems is that they operate on
the basis of the optimization of the overall system performance, neglecting the welfare
of the system users: service-providers and service-users. In this thesis, the territory
sharing problem is developed to include the aforementioned concerns as an explicit
aspect of the problem.
6.3 Territory Sharing Problem
In social taxi-networks, an increasing number of commuters rely on smartphone apps
that allow them to find a transportation service based on their locations. Likewise,
service providers ( i.e., taxi drivers) are dependent on smartphone apps to connect
them with potential customers based on their geographical proximity. Since these
apps operate on a location basis, and the drivers choose their own territory, a distur-
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bance in the supply and demand chain is inevitable. The rational thinking of each taxi
driver is to choose an area with an elevated chance of having potential customers. For
example, downtown areas and shopping districts are areas that have high popularity
among customers. Many of these customers are in need for door-to-door transporta-
tion services. However, since this is common knowledge, most service providers will
target these areas. This will lead to a situation in which we have some areas oversat-
urated with service providers, and other areas that have low to no existence of service
providers. Furthermore, the majority of the smartphone apps governing the social
taxi networks have a dynamic fare-rate that changes based on the availability of the
service. For peak time periods, the fare-prices are increased and vice versa. This
phenomenon is known as the tragedy of the commons [108], and it is pertinent to the
situation in which the resources are common and the users are selfish decision makers.
I call the problem of managing the routes among drivers based on their preferences
the territory sharing game.
There are various issues that can render the territory sharing game a challenging
problem. First, there is the issue of formulating the game such that a solution model
can be designed. The game consists of three parties: the players, the smartphone app,
and the resources. The smart application can be a participant or a game moderator.
Depending on its intended role, the game set-up will be different. Furthermore, if
the players use the resources as strategies to play among themselves, then the game
can be either symmetric or asymmetric. In symmetric games, the players possess
the same sets of strategies. For example, if there are only three possible actions
and all players have these actions as possible strategies, then the game is symmetric.
However, asymmetric games are more general in the sense that the players may have
non-identical sets of strategies. Hence, it is important to determine whether the game
is symmetric or asymmetric.
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Furthermore, once a game’s nature is defined, an additional problem arises in
determining a solution algorithm that can yield a stable outcome. A stable outcome
is a self enforcing outcome that meets certain criteria. This is the second challenge
in defining the territory sharing game. In regards to game theory, a stable solution
constitutes a stable equilibrium. Identifying the equilibrium sought will assist in
designing the solution model. It will also guide the assessment process of the obtained
solution, which leads to the third challenge: the evaluation of the effect of the solution
model on the overall performance (i.e., the welfare of the system). As discussed thus
far, the territory sharing problem suffers from the tragedy of the commons; hence,
a stable outcome does not guarantee the efficiency of resource utilization. To assess
the (in)efficiency of the proposed solution, the Price of Anarchy (PoA) is used.
In this chapter, a game theoretic formulation for the territory sharing problem is
developed. The model describes the problem as a cooperative game in which players
with asymmetric sets of strategies cooperate to reach strategic agreements, despite
the competition over the resources. An extended version of the bargaining-based
solution model introduced in Chapter 4 is developed to allow for the competition
procedure to take place, while it facilitates the achievement of the final agreement.
The agreement can be enforced using the social taxi networks moderator (i.e., the
smartphone app). To ensure that the final solution corresponds to a stable equilib-
rium, the bargaining framework utilizes the no-regret approach which results in a
coarse correlated equilibrium.
6.3.1 Game Description
The ability to enforce the final agreement situates the smartphone app in a position
to monitor and moderate, to a certain degree, the territory sharing game. The app
will not force drivers to make certain decisions. However, it can incentivize the drivers
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to participate in the game on the promise that the benefits of this game will outweigh
any alternatives. Furthermore, the app can limit the number of participating drivers
according to the service demands in certain areas. Thus, the problem of finding the
right number of players can be solved.
The desired outcome of the game is for drivers to agree collectively on the use
of certain strategies. The drivers will make their agreement based on their best
interests. The smartphone app will combine the localization functionality with the
decisions committed by the drivers. The app will force the drivers to commit to
their announced decisions should they wish to remain in the game. Through this
arrangement, a binding agreement is established; and the role of the app ends here.
The solution model will balance the process of supply and demand such that the
services are available at optimal times for all customers.
6.3.2 Problem Formulation
We consider a group of drivers TR = {tr1, tr2, , , , , trN}, each of which is request-
ing to have ownership of specific territories As. Each driver chooses several areas
of interest such that Atri =
{
Atri1 , A
tri
2 , , A
tri
n
}
with the pre-assigned prices CA
tri ={
cA
tri
1 , cA
tri
2 , , cA
tri
N
}
. These territories are in the form of paths in the same area such
that Atri = P tri , CA
tri =CP
tri , and P tri
{
ptri1 , p
tri
2 , , p
tri
n
}
. For each path, ptrij , a regu-
latory body Π assigns the usage-price cp
tri
j . This usage-price is equal for all drivers.
Let P tri be the set of strategies, represented by their actions, and Cp
tri
j be the utility
function for driver tri over p
tri
j . P
tri is a compact, differentiable, convex set for which
the usage-cost set CP
tri is computed via a positive non decreasing function. That is,
P tri is a bounded closed set that contains all of the desired strategies such that each
strategy will yield a positive utility value.
The game Σ is a 3-tuple (TR, P tri , CP
tri ) cooperative territory sharing game. The
124
CHAPTER 6. TREATMENT OF THE TERRITORY SHARING PROBLEM
regulatory body, Π, receives requests to reserve areas from the drivers. The regulatory
body computes CP
tri based on the drivers’ concentration in the areas of interest
and send this information to the drivers as well as the information about where the
drivers are situated. CP
tri represent the drivers’ expected fare price deduction for
each territory, i.e., the “loss” for every driver due to the declining fare rate. Once
the drivers receive CP
tri , they start the communication to reach an agreement with
regards to their chosen strategies (i.e., paths). Furthermore, Π defines a general cost
function C. C represents the overall system cost, given the action of the drivers,
whereas CP
tri is a personalized cost function for each driver.
Since the drivers are impacted by their individual decisions, a cooperative scheme
is needed to achieve the following:
C(s) = min
∀pj
N∑
1
Cp
tri
j (6.1)
such that
C(s) ≤
N∑
i=1
C(ptrij∗ , p
tr−i
j ) (6.2)
Equation 6.1 describes the problem as a game in which the goal is to have a minimum
overall cost. Furthermore, in Equation 6.2 the game is expected to arrive at an
equilibrium as a competitive game such that if any player unilaterally changed his/her
strategy to another strategy, the overall outcome wouldn’t improve.
6.3.3 Solution Formulation
Similar to the discussion in Chapter 5, the game described so far has two aspects. The
first aspect is the cost that each driver has to pay. Drivers would like to choose strate-
gies that guarantee them the lowest possible conflict cost. The Travellers-Centric Trip
Planning (TCTP) module is used to handle the personal strategies such that each
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driver will have few strategies reflecting their preferences. The second aspect is the
overall cost value that results from using the system. An overall cost minimization
might require the drivers to cooperate. Drivers who are most interested in increasing
their gains or reducing their cost values should form coalitions (Ss). The purpose
of these coalitions is to provide their members with a platform through which they
can make strategic agreements with regards to the utilization of mutual resources.
The resource sharing game is faced usually with the problem of forming cooperating
groups that adhere to their agreements. For our targeted application, this is made
simple. Customers contact the smartphone app expressing their interest in having
a door-to-door transportation service. The drivers contact the app expressing their
availability to provide this service. Both parties have no direct interaction, and their
communications are managed by the app. Therefore, the smartphone app can force
the social taxi drivers to abide by their established agreements.
Nevertheless, the drivers have no interest in joining an agreement that will not
benefit them. Subsequently, the solution should guarantee two outcomes. The first
outcome is related to the drivers’ geographical distribution such that the smartphone
app will assign appropriate cost values for various areas based on customer concen-
tration levels. The second outcome is achieved when the drivers are guaranteed to
have their gains increase, when they join the cooperative game. These outcomes are
best described by the game’s core:
Core(c) =
{
x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N
xi(N) = c(N) and
∑
i∈S
xi(s) ≤ c(s)∀s ∈ 2N \∅
}
(6.3)
As seen in Equation 6.3, the drivers are interested in joining a cooperative endeavour
if they are sure that they will individually benefit from cooperation. The core for-
mulation in Equation 6.3 corresponds to the requirements indicated in Equation 6.1
and Equation 6.2.
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6.3.4 Existence and (In)Efficiency of Game Theoretic Solu-
tions: No-regret Models
Before discussing the existence and efficiency of the proposed solution model, it is
important to discuss the various equilibria as they relate to the developed cooperative
game, as summarized in Figure 6.1. In literature, there is a wide range of problems
with a game theoretic presentation. A game theoretic set-up does not guarantee the
existence of a solution. A solution exists in a game when an equilibrium outcome
converges at the end of the game. Generally, there are three types of equilibria:
dominant equilibria, Nash equilibria, and correlated equilibria [109, 110], with each
type having its own variants. The dominant equilibria exist if players within a game
have strategies that can provide them with the best outcome regardless of the possible
strategies of other players. However, for the majority of resource sharing games such a
scenario is rare. Nash equilibrium has two main variants: pure equilibria and mixed
equilibria. Pure equilibria can be found and analyzed, but they don’t exist at all
times. On the other hand, the mixed equilibria always exist, but it is difficult to
be found. The correlated equilibrium can be seen as a general case of Nash’s mixed
equilibrium. The correlated equilibrium has two attractive features: first, it always
exists, and it can be found; second, the correlated equilibrium analysis is suitable for
games with subjective strategies. The correlated equilibrium is primarily described
as an outcome of a game in which a random device sends a signal to the players
describing/assessing a situation of interest. Therefore, through the signal, the device
can affect the players and correlate their choices [110]. In [111], Cigler and Faltings
have argued that the existence of a smart device is not needed to produce a correlated
equilibrium. Alternatively, for the equilibrium to be produced, it is sufficient to play
the game repeatedly and as such, the players will learn from previous rounds such
that they incorporate their knowledge in subsequent rounds [112].
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According to the team mobility planning framework, drivers view the environment
subjectively based on their chosen doctrines. Therefore, they have a fundamentally
different understanding and view of the same event. Hence, their negotiation process
is governed by their subjective views and subjective utility values. Furthermore, the
smartphone app is managing the communication between the drivers; thus, it permits
only the drivers within the same area to participate in the game according to certain
criteria defined by the app. Therefore, by virtue of having the app, the territory
sharing game can be defined as a correlated game with correlated equilibria. However,
this definition will pose a major concern of forcing the players to 1) have complete
information about other participants in the game, and 2) to have sets of available
strategies that are uniformed and symmetrical for all participants. The failure to
meet these conditions will limit the successful outcome of the territory sharing game.
In most cases, the players are private individuals who would not broadcast their
strategies and will not share their expected gains. Furthermore, the symmetry of the
game is difficult to achieve since the players have subjective doctrine-based strategies
that are personalized to their preferences. This asymmetry of the territory sharing
game, and the use of the TCTP module as a mean of strategizing for drivers, would
give rise to a problematic situation if the game is viewed as a non-cooperative pure or
mixed game. That is, the drivers are incapable of forming expectations of the other
drivers’ actions. The game’s incomplete information and asymmetry are challenging
intrinsic aspects of the territory sharing game.
The game’s incomplete information might give rise to regrets among players as the
game progresses. The need to have no-regret in the game should be addressed as a
part of the need to have a stable, self enforcing outcome. The correlated equilibrium
might not be sufficient to deal with the regret aspect of the game, where the outcome
will result in a poor equilibrium, hence the regret. It is possible to mitigate the regret
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by “sequentializing” the game such that the repetitive partaking in the game should
lead to the vanishing of regret. This outcome corresponds to a coarse correlated
equilibrium such that the process of game sequentialization will produce a regret-free
outcome through probabilistic strategizing.
The discussion thus far has progressed in a manner in which the different forms of
team trip planning will lead to 1) a pure or mixed-equilibrium as argued in Chapter
4 and shown in Chapter 5, 2) a correlated equilibrium as discussed earlier via either
the smartphone app or the repetitiveness of the game, or 3) a coarse correlated
equilibrium. These equilibria are inter-related such that each equilibrium encompasses
the previous ones as shown in Figure 6.1
PNE
MNE
CE
CCE
Achieved using Pure 
Strategies from the TCTP 
Module
Achieved using the TCTP 
Module with Probabilistic 
Replanning
Achieved using the 
Extended Bargaining model 
(Smartphone app)
Achieved using the Extended 
Bargaining model 
(Smartphone app+repetitive 
play over T)
Figure 6.1: The different equilibria in order of simplicity and existence. The original
concept of the Figure appears in [113]
The coarse correlated equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium that is smoothed.
Smooth games admit canonical bounds of the Price of Anarchy (PoA) such that the
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in(efficiency) of the outcome is mitigated/eliminated [113]. Furthermore, the PoA is
the most commonly used criteria in assessing the (in)efficiency of a solution. The
PoA, as defined in Chapter 4, is an index that measures the impact of the selfish
behaviour of the system’s users on the overall system performance by comparing the
worst equilibrium with the best possible outcome. For the resource sharing problems,
there are several assessments of the PoA values under various assumptions. For
example, Johari and Tsitsiklis argued in [114] that for players who have formulated
an estimation regarding the impact of their actions on the prices, the lower bound
for the aggregated utility is 75% of the best case scenario. The reason for the tight
lower bound is that the players are conscious of the consequences of their actions,
which subsequently affects their choices. For other scenarios that have less desirable
conditions, the PoA’s lower bounds decrease. In [115], Bachrach et al. proposed that
for a wide-range of coalitional games, in which the players expect their utilities to be
at least equal to their individual non-cooperative contribution/cost values, the strong
PoA is 50% of the optimum scenario. This variation of the lower and upper bounds
is attributed to the specific details of the games and the proposed solution methods.
Nonetheless, for various games, these bounds provide a general expectation of the
gains and losses due to the adoption of the cooperational approaches as opposed to
the non-cooperational approaches.
Next, we discuss the integration of the coarse correlated equilibria, the smoothness
of the game, and the PoA bounds into the bargaining model, initially described in
Chapter 4.
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6.4 Extended Bargaining Model
The previous discussion highlighted the fact that the team trip planning game has
mixed elements of cooperation and non-cooperation. The bargaining model, as de-
scribed in Chapter 4, is cooperative in the sense that the final outcome is not self-
enforced but enforced through a binding agreement. Furthermore, the cooperative
nature of the team trip planning game is a major aspect in the construction of the
territory sharing problem as a cooperative game. Nevertheless, the later analysis
has heavily deployed tools that have been conventionally used for non-cooperative
games. This is hardly a dichotomous employment of these tools and solution meth-
ods. The cooperative and non-cooperative aspects of game theory are not viewed as
opposing branches. They are rather viewed as two possible methods of approaching
team planning problems from two different perspectives and as such, depending on
the application, the analyses may overlap. To better highlight the relationship be-
tween cooperative and non-cooperative games we quote R. J. Aumann: “Formally,
cooperative games may be considered a special case of non-cooperative games, in the
sense that one may build the negotiation and enforcement procedure explicitly into the
extensive form of the game. Historically, however, this has not been the mainstream
approach. Rather, cooperative theory starts out with a formalization of games (the
coalitional form) that abstracts away altogether from procedures and form the ques-
tion of how each player can best manipulate them for his own benefits; it concentrates,
instead, on the possibilities for agreement” [116]. The solution model in this research
work follows the formal definition of cooperative games.
In contrast to the work in many of the recent publications, I have developed a
solution model that has a negotiation procedure between the players while the final
agreement is enforced through mutual threat or through the game moderator. Hence,
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similar to Proposition 4.2.1, in the territory sharing game, it is assumed that the
drivers will give up on a preferred strategy during the process of negotiation in the
pursuit of an agreement. This assumption might contradict Equation 6.2. Therefore,
we start by reformulating Equation 6.2 such that for a series of sequential negotiation
rounds and agreed upon sets of actions (P 1, P 2, P 3, , , P T ) over T time, Equation 6.2
becomes
1
T
C(s) ≤ 1
T
N∑
i=1
C(ptrij∗ , p
tr−i
j ) (6.4)
Proof
T∑
1
C(st) =
T∑
1
N∑
1
C(stri
t
) (6.5)
T∑
1
C(st) =
T∑
1
N∑
1
[C(ptrij∗ , p
tr−i
j ) + ∆tri,t] (6.6)
∆tri,t = C(s
t)− C(ptrij∗ , p
trt−i
j ) (6.7)
The dual use of the sequential playing and the smartphone app as a “referee” can
guarantee that we have a correlated equilibrium (CE). However, to guarantee that
the drivers will have regret-free outcomes, the smoothness assumption detailed in
[46,109,117] is used to formulate the following relationship:
N∑
i=1
C(ptrij∗ , p
tr−i
j ) ≤ λ · C(ptrij∗ ) + µ · C(ptrij ) (6.8)
Therefore,
T∑
1
C(st) ≤
T∑
1
λ · C(ptrij∗ ) +
T∑
1
µ · C(ptritj ) +
T∑
1
N∑
1
∆Xi,t (6.9)
For each tri, the no-regret model is used to present the following assumption
T∑
1
∆tri,t ≤ 0 (6.10)
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Hence
1
T
C(st) ≤ 1
T
λ · C(ptrij∗ ) +
1
T
µ · C(ptritj ) (6.11)

For the territory sharing game, Equation 6.9 and Equation 6.10 can be expressed
as follows:
T∑
1
C(st) ≤
T∑
1
λ · C(ptrij∗ ) +
T∑
1
µ · C(ptritj )−
T∑
1
N∑
1
∆tri,t (6.12)
and
T∑
1
∆tri,t ≥ 0, (6.13)
where
ptrij∗ = The optimum strategy of player tri,
T = Time window and t ∈ T ,
λ, µ = Smoothness parameters such that λ > 0 and µ < 1,
∆tri,t = The gain/cost incurred by driver tri at instance t.
The game according to Equation 6.8-6.13 allows for the integration of “no regret”
dynamics resulting in a coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE).
The bargaining model operates similarly to the model described in Chapter 4. Ad-
ditionally, the smartphone app Π plays an integral role in assigning a cost function for
each area. These cost values (CP
tri s) are communicated to the drivers. Furthermore,
the values can be unique to the drivers such that the cost value for CP
tr1 can be dif-
ferent than CP
tr2 . This method is not to centralize the game but to force the drivers
to withhold their agreements. Should a driver deviate from an agreement, Π can raise
the cost value to prevent the driver from profiting. Furthermore, by controlling the
prices, Π can control the number of competing drivers per area. Otherwise, the prices
are the same for all players. In all cases, the decisions regarding the strategies are
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made with correlation to CP
tri .
Once the drivers receive their CP
tri s, they start arranging their areas in order
of their preferences. According to their chosen doctrines, and using their TCTP
modules, they communicate their strategies to each other via Π. The identity and
the number of the drivers involved in the game are decided by Π. Therefore, a
case in which the supply and demand are out of balance is avoided. The pairwise
negotiation will proceed as discussed in Chapter 4. Once the drivers agree on their
chosen strategies, they communicate their agreement to the smartphone app Π. The
agreement will then be enforced, and no driver can change their strategy.
The drivers have the right to play the game once and then move on to a different
area, or they may join the game again. However, the CP
tri can be different for each
round and not necessarily repeated. Therefore, the choices made by the drivers are
strictly correlated with the existence of the smartphone app Π. In the case that
Π should relinquish its control over the cost values of various areas, the choices of
the players in each round become correlated with their choices in previous rounds.
The number of rounds, players, and the cost prices are inferred from the smoothing
process of the game such that the outcome converges to a no-regret model.
Next, a simulation work that discusses the territory sharing game and its solutions
according to the developed no-regret-based bargaining model is presented.
6.5 Simulation Work
In this simulation work, N drivers who have access to two business areas are simulated.
Each area has two paths. Each driver is required to choose at least two non-identical
paths. The number of drivers (N) can vary from one experimental set up to another.
Through this simulation, we first demonstrate the territory sharing game with
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different number of players discussing the expected gains/losses. We will also examine
the validity of Equation 6.11 for our model. The simulation work will examine the
value of ∆tri for all players, if the game was to be played for a period of 30 days.
Furthermore, the efficiency of the game model is examined using the Price of Anarchy
(PoA). PoA is computed as the following:
PoA =
maxpj
∑N
1 C
p
tri
j
minpj
∑N
1 C
p
tri
j
(6.14)
Next, the behaviour of our model for 10 drivers is demonstrated.
6.5.1 Territory Sharing Beween 10 Drivers
In this scenario, 10 drivers randomly choose their sets of strategies. Their profits are
penalized by the smartphone app according to their chosen territories. If two drivers
chose the same path, the path price will be increased by 2 price units for each driver.
Therefore, their collective goal from playing this game is to minimize their overall
sharing incidents as well as their individual penalties.
Each player starts the game by broadcasting a set of strategies that has only
two alternatives
{
ptri1 , p
tri
2
}
. All drivers announce that their preferred strategy is
p1, and each driver will compute the overall sharing incidents, as shown in Table
6.1. According to Equation 6.12, and as shown in Table 6.2, various coalitions are
formed. After the coalitions are established, the first round of negotiation begins.
The coalition formation rounds are governed by the two conditions of rationality and
efficiency, as indicated in Equation 6.3. As seen in Table 6.1, for the first round, the
second condition is met. However, for tr4 and tr9, they see their price shares increasing
since they joined their respective coalitions. Therefore, over two rounds, the drivers
are allowed to examine independently their cost values outside of their coalition.
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Table 6.1: Negotiations for cooperative territory sharing game
Players Selfish Game
Cooperative Game Outcome
∆tri1st Round 2nd Round 3rd Round
tr1 15 12 9 6 0
tr2 15 6 3 3 6
tr3 9 9 9 9 9
tr4 9 18 9 9 9
tr5 15 12 9 6 0
tr6 9 3 6 9 11
tr7 15 10 7 5 4
tr8 15 12 9 6 4
tr9 9 17 20 9 11
tr10 15 5 5 2 7∑N=10
1 C
tri(ptrij ) 126 104 86 64 NA
Table 6.2: Coalition formation in the territory sharing game
Coalition No. Coalition Members Strategy Agreement
1 tr1, tr2
{
ptr11 , p
tr2
2
}
2 tr3, tr4
{
ptr31 , p
tr4
2
}
3 tr5, tr7
{
ptr51 , p
tr7
2
}
4 tr6, tr9
{
ptr61 , p
tr9
2
}
5 tr8, tr10
{
ptr81 , p
tr10
2
}
After the third round, they confirm that their cost values outside of their coalition
are improved, and therefore they secede from their coalitions. In this scenario, the
final grand coalition is found as follows:
P S
Gnd
=
{
ptr11 , p
tr2
2 , p
tr3
1 , p
tr4
2 , p
tr5
1 , p
tr6
1 , p
tr7
2 , p
tr8
1 , p
tr9
2 , p
tr10
2
}
(6.15)
6.5.2 Smoothness and Convergence of CCE
The previous scenario included 10 drivers for which a cooperative solution is found.
By examining ∆tri in the previous scenario, it can be confirmed that the cooperative
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solution corresponds to a Nash equilibrium for the drivers. However, the possibility of
this outcome being consistent for all possible cases can be challenged. If Assumption
4.3.1 is applied and Nash equilibrium did not converge, then the no-regret approach
should come into play such that in any case we should have
∑T
1 ∆tri,t ≤ 0, and the
final solution will converge to the CCE. To verify this hypothesis, more than a 1000
scenarios for various values of N were implemented, while simulating situations in
which the games are played repeatedly over a period of 30 days (T ≤ 30).
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Figure 6.2: Values of ∆tri,t computed over 30 days for N = 10, 15, 20, 25, 30.
As shown in Figure 6.2, for up to 30 drivers, the
∑T
1 ∆tri,t has a positive value
reflecting the gain achieved by cooperation between drivers. This result demonstrates
the ability of our model to provide drivers with an acceptable state of equilibrium.
However, it is important to keep in mind that this case is true for when N ≤ 30,
|P tri | = 2, and |P S| = 4. If the number of players is arbitrarily increased without
offering more options, the final result may not converge to a coarse correlated equi-
librium (CCE), even if a momentary gain is found. However, an argument can be
made that with the existence of the smartphone app, the outcome will converge to a
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CE.
As can be seen in Figure 6.3, when more drivers are allowed to compete for
customers, the overall results will not conform to Equation 6.11. Therefore, to deal
with this issue, there are two options: either to increase the value of T and observe∑T
1 ∆tri,t for a longer period of time, or to increase the number of offered strategies.
With the former option, a CCE may or may not converge. Whereas, with the latter
option, by diversifying and broadening the search space, we are assured to get a CCE.
With regards to our application, one of our goals is to distribute the drivers among
all possible areas which the customers frequent the most. Therefore, as more drivers
express their interest in playing the game, it is logical to increase the coverage areas.
The burden of dealing with this issue will fall on Π. For our scenario, we have added
two more paths such that |P S| = 6. For each driver, the value of |P tri | will remain
to be 2. However, each player will have a bigger “pool” of strategies to choose from.
As shown in Figure 6.4, we can see that for the same coalition formulation and over
the same period of time, a coarse correlated equilibrium has converged.
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Figure 6.3: Values of ∆tri,t computed over 30 days for N = (35, 40, 45, 50) with
|P S| = 4.
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Figure 6.4: Values of ∆tri,t computed over 30 days for N = (35, 40, 45, 50) with
|P S| = 6.
6.5.3 Overall System Performance
The simulation work presented has thus far shown the effectiveness of our model in
terms of the individual cost distribution and the converged equilibrium. Regardless,
since our bargaining model is a heuristic one, a stronger form of validation might
be required. For this purpose, we will use the PoA as a tool of assessment. For
N ≤= 20 we can compare the converged equilibrium with the best case scenario.
However, for N > 20 this might be difficult since the search space for |P tri | = 2 is
2 × 2N . Therefore, the assessment will include a comparison with the deterministic
best equilibrium as well as a comparison with the estimated “best” equilibrium.
6.5.3.1 Deterministic Equilibrium vs Achieved Equilibrium
We will use the case of N = 20 to compare the overall cost of our achieved equilibrium
with the deterministic best and worst equilibria which were determined through brute
search. As can be seen in Table 6.3, the calculated PoA for 10 days is consistently
high. In comparison, the PoA from our model is close to optimum (i.e., close to 1).
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Table 6.3: Converged equilibrium for 20 drivers over 10 days
Days Best Equilibrium Worst Equilibrium Achieved Equilibrium PoA Achieved PoA
1 370 984 390 2.66 1.05
2 382 1044 392 2.73 1.03
3 564 1120 592 1.99 1.05
4 418 1260 432 3.01 1.03
5 306 816 320 2.67 1.05
6 336 1212 402 3.61 1.20
7 382 1120 392 2.93 1.03
8 364 1022 396 2.81 1.09
9 348 1038 352 2.98 1.01
10 348 1038 388 2.98 1.11
6.5.3.2 Estimated Equilibrium vs Achieved Equilibrium
As mentioned before, as the number of drivers increases, it becomes impossible to
find the best and worst equilibria through brute force search. Alternatively, few
assumptions are made regarding the estimated best and worst equilibria. First, the
worst equilibrium is assumed to be the converging outcome when all drivers choose
their least favoured strategy. Therefore, this can be considered as a strong upper
bound. For the lower bound (i.e., the best equilibrium), it is rather difficult to make
any form of direct estimation of the best equilibrium. Hence, we assume that the
system’s PoA is
√
N =
√
30 = 5.4, which corresponds to the PoA ratio for a 3rd
degree polynomial cost function, and from this value it is possible to compute the
best possible outcome. Obviously, these are strong assumptions. However, as seen in
Table 6.4, even though the achieved PoA is slightly worse than the case for 10 drivers,
our model’s efficiency with regards to the overall performance is demonstrated.
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Table 6.4: Converged equilibrium for 30 drivers over 10 days
Days Best Equilibrium Estimated Worst Equilibrium Achieved Equilibrium PoA =
√
N Achieved PoA
1 502 2712 788 5.40 1.57
2 447 2414 628 5.40 1.40
3 453 2448 795 5.40 1.75
4 468 2526 576 5.40 1.23
5 502 2712 589 5.40 1.17
6 441 2380 556 5.40 1.26
7 488 2634 602 5.40 1.23
8 478 2580 685 5.40 1.43
9 468 2526 816 5.40 1.74
10 459 2480 582 5.40 1.27
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we described a territory sharing game for social taxi networks. In this
game, a regulatory body in form of smartphone app allows for a group of drivers to
engage in a cooperative endeavour by which they earn the right to operate in certain
attraction areas. We have extended the previously developed bargaining model to
accommodate the app as a referee for the game. A no regret based approach was
developed to ensure that the final outcome of our game will converge to a coarse
correlated equilibrium.
To validate the developed model, we conducted an extensive experimental work.
Through this work, we demonstrate the implementation of our model, the effectiveness
of the no-regret model, and provide an analysis of the overall system efficiency by
examining the Price of Anarchy (PoA).
The developed model has been shown to be successful in handling the various
examined scenarios. The performance was robust, and the empirical results adhered
to the theoretical formulation.
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Conclusions and Future Directions
7.1 Introduction
Team mobility planning has been a point of interest in a multitude of areas of re-
search. As an optimization problem, a variety of solutions were presented to deal with
trip planning for both individuals and groups of travellers. However, these solutions
are constrained by the nature of their applications. On the other hand, as a game
theoretic problem, multiple analyses were presented in the literature categorizing the
trip planning game as either cooperative or non-cooperative.
The main objective of the research work in this thesis is to develop a team mo-
bility planning framework. The framework is designed to approach the team trip
planning problem as a cooperative game. Furthermore, as a modularized framework,
the traveller-centric trip planner module has been developed to independently address
the non-cooperative team trip planning. In the following sections I summarize the
major contributions of this work, and I provide suggestions for future directions.
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7.2 Major Contributions
1. A game formulation of the team trip planning problem that encompasses the
individual and the team aspects of the problem has been developed. While the
mathematical formulation of the problem sets the foundation for the developed
solution work, its formulation has been maintained to be general and usable for
other possible solution models.
2. A novel team mobility planning framework has been presented. The framework
has been modularized such that each module in it can be considered an inde-
pendent solution model. For example, the framework in general can be used for
cooperative trip planning. On the other hand, the traveller-centric trip planning
module can be used as an independent system that deals with non-cooperative
team trip planning. Furthermore, the TCTP module has been used as a tool to
produce behavioural based strategies that reflect the personal planning beliefs
of the travellers.
3. A bargaining model has been formulated to deal with the team trip planning
game as a cooperative problem. The model in its original design has produced
a stable outcome under an enforced agreement. Furthermore, in the case that
an enforced agreement is not reached, the outcome will correspond with mixed
Nash equilibria.
4. A novel traveller-centric trip planning module has been presented. The module
deploys hard and soft objectives to produce a trip plan that is personalized for
each traveller. The use of this module has been shown to produce a better sys-
tem welfare as compared to existing solutions. Furthermore, the traveller-centric
trip planning module has been used to produce the personalized strategies for
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each traveller in the team trip planning game.
5. A novel game theoretic formulation of the territory sharing game for social taxi
networks has been developed. The formulation has taken into account the usage
of smartphone applications (Apps) as the medium of communication between
the travellers. Furthermore, the game formulation has situated the smartphone
app to be an external referee of the game. The unique position of the app
as part of the game, but not as a player, has been used to demonstrate the
existence of a correlated equilibrium and a coarse correlated equilibrium.
6. An extension of the bargaining model that deals with the competitive aspect of
the game has been presented. In conjunction with the external referee, the bar-
gaining model has produced an outcome that corresponds to a coarse correlated
equilibrium. The model has been extended to behave similarly to a no-regret
model.
7.3 Future Research Directions
The research work presented in this thesis has addressed the main goals declared
herein as research gaps, and has also demonstrated the capabilities of the developed
framework in achieving these goals. Additionally, this work has uncovered other issues
that deserve further research work.
1. With regards to the team mobility framework, the issue pertaining to the opti-
mum number of players is not addressed in detail. This is an important factor
which might lead to the instability of the final outcome as discussed in Chapter
2. Although the smartphone app is used in Chapter 6 to deal with this problem,
a more integrated solution might be needed in future. The Price of Anarchy
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can be used as a method of upper bounding the number of players based on
general assessment of various equilibria. The problem with this approach is that
it is localized to each game. Alternatively, dynamic bounding of the different
approaches should be investigated.
2. With regards to the traveller-centric trip planner, as shown by the experimental
work in this thesis, there are promising results from using the doctrines. How-
ever, to understand the exact impact of the doctrines on the traffic requires an
experimental work on a large scale under a wide range of scenarios. This should
be carried out in future research work.
3. The doctrines chosen in this thesis are limited to three main factors. In future
work, it is possible to expand the fuzzy sets to include more doctrines and
preferences. The safety doctrine, for example, can be expanded to include
other factors such as the rate of traffic accident, visibility, pavement quality,
travellers’ age and experience, and weather conditions such as fog, rain and
hail. Moreover, geographic models could be adopted to consider sand storms
instead of snow storms and the existence of sand on roads instead of snow and
black ice.
4. For the territory sharing problem, it is possible to add to the set of strategies
some form of time stamps. That is, the model will not only operate on location
basis, but it will be a locationally and temporally aware model. Furthermore,
the time window (T) in the no regret model can be dynamic to serve both short
and long term goals.
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